Crossroads Asia | Economy | Central Asia

Uzbekistan’s Afghanistan Push Accelerates

With growing trade volumes, infrastructure initiatives, and initial geological explorations in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is testing whether economic interdependence and proximity can function as a substitute for political recognition. 

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev received Afghanistan’s Acting Minister of Industry and Trade Nuriddin Azizi in June 2025.

In late February 2026, Uzbek officials quietly confirmed that economic integration with Afghanistan is accelerating at a pace that outstrips earlier projections. Reportedly, trade turnover between the two countries in 2025 reached $1.5 billion ($1.68 billion in other sources) reflecting a 53 percent increase compared to the previous year and a 2.5 fold rise from $653 million reported in 2021. 

After a video conference with Afghanistan’s Acting Minister of Industry and Trade Nuriddin Azizi on February 26, Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjaev said that the two sides intend to increase this figure up to $5 billion, with a business forum in Kabul and a roadmap outlining priority areas scheduled after Ramadan – the Muslim holy month lasting till late March this year. Khodjayev also mentioned that the parties are working to accelerate the entry into force of the Preferential Trade Agreement that they signed in June 2025

A day later, presidential spokesperson Sherzod Asadov also highlighted the “great results” the Termez International Trade Center (or the Airitom Free Zone) has achieved. The center, as he noted, welcomed more than 800,000 Afghan citizens last year with exports reaching $320 million. The Airitom Free Zone on the Afghan border was launched in 2023 to allow cross-border trade. Afghan citizens are able to enter the zone visa-free for up to 15 days. The center is set to be expanded to 1,000 hectares with an export volume expected to reach $600 million this year and $1 billion next year. According to Asadov, a special legal regime will also be established with a dedicated prosecutor’s office and the internal affairs department at Airitom. The trade in goods and services will be counted as exports with value added tax applied at a zero rate. 

All of this is unfolding without formal recognition by Tashkent of the Taliban-led government in Kabul.

For Tashkent, the logic is straightforward: an economic collapse in Afghanistan could translate into instability along the country’s southern border. So Uzbekistan has opted to invest in maintaining economic stability in Afghanistan as a security strategy, an approach that also has opened a new market for Uzbek businesses. As of 2025, Afghanistan has become the fourth largest export destination country for Uzbek goods after Russia, China, and Kazakhstan, with exports totaling $1.5 billion.

Afghanistan, for example, has quickly become Uzbekistan’s top wheat export destination. The volume of wheat exported reached almost 1.6 million tons. As a comparison point, the other neighboring countries bought far less: Tajikistan, 607 tons; Kyrgyzstan, 356 tons; and the rest even less. Last year, Afghan citizens made the largest share of visitors to Uzbekistan on business purposes with over 400,000 arrivals recorded. To compare, merely 18,000 visitors from Tajikistan and 9,000 from Turkmenistan came with the same purpose. The number of tourists from Afghanistan is also increasing with over 40,000 visitors in the first month of 2026 crossing the border. Afghanistan also has entered the top 10 countries with a high number of enterprises with foreign investment participation in Uzbekistan. As of this February, Uzbekistan has 647 enterprises with investment from Afghanistan. 

But Uzbekistan’s preventive security strategy cannot be reduced to economic integration alone. This February, the Uzbek Overseas Geology Company started on-the-ground geological exploration operations for hydrocarbon deposits along with iron and copper reserves in northern Afghanistan. This signals that Uzbekistan is moving from just trade relations to long-term resource cooperation. Apart from that, the draft of the “Uzbekistan 2030” state program suggested that Uzbekistan is interested in engaging in military cooperation with Afghanistan, among other Central Asian nations in the coming fall, although no decision regarding this has been made yet. 

The implication of these developments is clear, Uzbekistan is creating a framework of de facto normalization while withholding formal recognition. The fact that this normalization is coming with material gains helps Tashkent to set its priorities above symbolic international law that isolates the Taliban-led government. Uzbekistan is not necessarily challenging the framework set by Western nations, but it is circumventing the established isolation practices. 

This creates a secondary exposure risk for Uzbek firms should Western sanctions tighten. Furthermore, political volatility risks remain. A sudden spike in instability in Afghanistan could disturb trade and infrastructure commitments. While trade can be quickly stopped, resource extraction is a long-term project. If Uzbek firms succeed in securing hydrocarbon or mineral extraction rights in Afghanistan, this necessitates further investment in Afghanistan’s infrastructure from Uzbekistan’s side while keeping security guarantees in mind.

The trade developments between the two parties also affirm that Uzbekistan has positioned itself as Kabul’s northern economic gateway, with Afghanistan depending on electricity, wheat, and construction materials from Uzbekistan. This creates asymmetrical leverage for Tashkent which could become crucial in future discussions over water resource allocations. 

If Uzbekistan succeeds in embedding Afghanistan into Central Asian trade networks, it will demonstrate that non-recognition does not prevent normalization and that geography and economic interdependence could be far more important than unresolved political legitimacy issues. However, Tashkent’s bid also risks being perceived not as pragmatic, but as a political endorsement which may not be welcomed by its Western partners.

This research was supported by a Marie Curie Staff Exchange within the Horizon Europe Programme (CARSI, no: 101086415) 

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In late February 2026, Uzbek officials quietly confirmed that economic integration with Afghanistan is accelerating at a pace that outstrips earlier projections. Reportedly, trade turnover between the two countries in 2025 reached $1.5 billion ($1.68 billion in other sources) reflecting a 53 percent increase compared to the previous year and a 2.5 fold rise from $653 million reported in 2021. 

After a video conference with Afghanistan’s Acting Minister of Industry and Trade Nuriddin Azizi on February 26, Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjaev said that the two sides intend to increase this figure up to $5 billion, with a business forum in Kabul and a roadmap outlining priority areas scheduled after Ramadan – the Muslim holy month lasting till late March this year. Khodjayev also mentioned that the parties are working to accelerate the entry into force of the Preferential Trade Agreement that they signed in June 2025

A day later, presidential spokesperson Sherzod Asadov also highlighted the “great results” the Termez International Trade Center (or the Airitom Free Zone) has achieved. The center, as he noted, welcomed more than 800,000 Afghan citizens last year with exports reaching $320 million. The Airitom Free Zone on the Afghan border was launched in 2023 to allow cross-border trade. Afghan citizens are able to enter the zone visa-free for up to 15 days. The center is set to be expanded to 1,000 hectares with an export volume expected to reach $600 million this year and $1 billion next year. According to Asadov, a special legal regime will also be established with a dedicated prosecutor’s office and the internal affairs department at Airitom. The trade in goods and services will be counted as exports with value added tax applied at a zero rate. 

All of this is unfolding without formal recognition by Tashkent of the Taliban-led government in Kabul.

For Tashkent, the logic is straightforward: an economic collapse in Afghanistan could translate into instability along the country’s southern border. So Uzbekistan has opted to invest in maintaining economic stability in Afghanistan as a security strategy, an approach that also has opened a new market for Uzbek businesses. As of 2025, Afghanistan has become the fourth largest export destination country for Uzbek goods after Russia, China, and Kazakhstan, with exports totaling $1.5 billion.

Afghanistan, for example, has quickly become Uzbekistan’s top wheat export destination. The volume of wheat exported reached almost 1.6 million tons. As a comparison point, the other neighboring countries bought far less: Tajikistan, 607 tons; Kyrgyzstan, 356 tons; and the rest even less. Last year, Afghan citizens made the largest share of visitors to Uzbekistan on business purposes with over 400,000 arrivals recorded. To compare, merely 18,000 visitors from Tajikistan and 9,000 from Turkmenistan came with the same purpose. The number of tourists from Afghanistan is also increasing with over 40,000 visitors in the first month of 2026 crossing the border. Afghanistan also has entered the top 10 countries with a high number of enterprises with foreign investment participation in Uzbekistan. As of this February, Uzbekistan has 647 enterprises with investment from Afghanistan. 

But Uzbekistan’s preventive security strategy cannot be reduced to economic integration alone. This February, the Uzbek Overseas Geology Company started on-the-ground geological exploration operations for hydrocarbon deposits along with iron and copper reserves in northern Afghanistan. This signals that Uzbekistan is moving from just trade relations to long-term resource cooperation. Apart from that, the draft of the “Uzbekistan 2030” state program suggested that Uzbekistan is interested in engaging in military cooperation with Afghanistan, among other Central Asian nations in the coming fall, although no decision regarding this has been made yet. 

The implication of these developments is clear, Uzbekistan is creating a framework of de facto normalization while withholding formal recognition. The fact that this normalization is coming with material gains helps Tashkent to set its priorities above symbolic international law that isolates the Taliban-led government. Uzbekistan is not necessarily challenging the framework set by Western nations, but it is circumventing the established isolation practices. 

This creates a secondary exposure risk for Uzbek firms should Western sanctions tighten. Furthermore, political volatility risks remain. A sudden spike in instability in Afghanistan could disturb trade and infrastructure commitments. While trade can be quickly stopped, resource extraction is a long-term project. If Uzbek firms succeed in securing hydrocarbon or mineral extraction rights in Afghanistan, this necessitates further investment in Afghanistan’s infrastructure from Uzbekistan’s side while keeping security guarantees in mind.

The trade developments between the two parties also affirm that Uzbekistan has positioned itself as Kabul’s northern economic gateway, with Afghanistan depending on electricity, wheat, and construction materials from Uzbekistan. This creates asymmetrical leverage for Tashkent which could become crucial in future discussions over water resource allocations. 

If Uzbekistan succeeds in embedding Afghanistan into Central Asian trade networks, it will demonstrate that non-recognition does not prevent normalization and that geography and economic interdependence could be far more important than unresolved political legitimacy issues. However, Tashkent’s bid also risks being perceived not as pragmatic, but as a political endorsement which may not be welcomed by its Western partners.

This research was supported by a Marie Curie Staff Exchange within the Horizon Europe Programme (CARSI, no: 101086415) 

Niginakhon Saida is a doctoral research fellow at MALVA Center for the Study of War, Language, and Memory at JGU Mainz.

Afghanistan-Central Asia relations

Afghanistan-Uzbekistan relations

Uzbekistan Afghanistan policy

Uzbekistan foreign policy

Uzbekistan-Taliban relations

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