Features | Politics | East Asia

North Korea Codifies Nuclear Statehood and Hostile ‘Two-State’ Relations at 9th Party Congress

During the seven-day WPK conclave, Kim Jong Un introduced the “Haekpangasoe” system while reaffirming his will to beef up nuclear capabilities in a new five-year military development plan.

In this photo provided by North Korean state media, Kim Jong Un gives a speech at the concluding session of the Ninth Party Congress, Feb. 24, 2026.

The Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), which concluded its final session on February 25, fundamentally reordered the geopolitical framework of the Korean Peninsula. Through a comprehensive review of the party’s strategic direction, Kim Jong Un, the autocratic leader of North Korea, formalized the permanent severance of ties with South Korea and institutionalized a high-tech nuclear doctrine for the newly elected WPK leadership. 

The Ninth Congress – held for seven days from February 19 to 25 – served as a definitive proclamation that North Korea has moved beyond the era of nuclear aspiration, cementing its status as a permanent nuclear-armed state with an operationalized arsenal.

A pivotal outcome of the Congress was the formalization of “Haekpangasoe,” translated literally as “nuclear trigger.” In the report on the Ninth Congress released by Korean Central News Agency, North Korea’s state media outlet, Haekpangasoe represented an integrated nuclear crisis response system designed to ensure that the national nuclear shield could be operated promptly and accurately at any moment. 

By utilizing the term “trigger,” Pyongyang signaled a shift toward a more automated and responsive command-and-control structure, aimed at ensuring sensitive responsiveness to perceived threats. The technological upgrading of North Korea’s nuclear force effectively shifted the mission of the nuclear deterrent to include pre-emptive strike capabilities as stipulated by national law.

The report also detailed a new long-term national defense plan involving the introduction of AI-driven unmanned weapons and special assets for neutralizing enemy satellites. The mass deployment of 600 mm and new-type 240 mm multiple rocket launchers was designated as the primary means for deterring targets within the territory of South Korea. According to Pyongyang, its military modernization effort is a strategic necessity to neutralize the pressure from the United States and its regional allies.

Beyond military doctrine, the Ninth Congress laid out the “2026-2030 National Economic Development Five-Year Plan,” with a focus on total self-reliance and agricultural stability. The WPK set an ambitious annual grain production target of 9.5 million tons by 2030, supported by the planned reclamation of 300,000 hectares of tideland. This emphasis on food sovereignty is not merely a domestic policy but a prerequisite for the regime’s “two-state” stance. By aiming for agricultural autarky, Pyongyang seeks to eliminate any need for South Korean humanitarian aid, thereby reinforcing its permanent severance from Seoul. 

In the industrial sector, the goal to increase steel and chemical fiber production by 150 percent further demonstrates a strategic shift toward a siege economy capable of withstanding prolonged isolation. Simultaneously, North Korea reinforced its ideological fortress by intensifying the Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, specifically targeting the younger generation to insulate them from South Korean cultural influence and ensure absolute loyalty to the new two-state narrative.

The Ninth Congress marked the final and legal termination of 80 years of inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang officially defined South Korea as the “out-and-out first hostile state” and the “immutable principal enemy,” a move that effectively discarded long-standing policies based on ethnic solidarity or the pursuit of national reunification. North Korea also confirmed that all channels and spaces of contact in the southern border areas were physically blocked and were being militarily fortified. The shift toward a hostile “two-state” relationship led to the dissolution of various state organs and agencies in North Korea that had been tasked with inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation.

The North’s strategic shift solidified the “relations between two hostile states” first declared by Kim Jong Un during the WPK’s year-end plenary meeting in late 2023. By formally adopting this stance at the Ninth Congress, North Korea transformed what was once a rhetorical declaration into a permanent and constitutional pillar of its national policy.

Pyongyang’s consistent antagonism toward Seoul can be viewed as Kim’s attempt to justify preemptive military action and insulate the North Korean populace from the South’s cultural influence. Kim also made clear that he sees no reason to negotiate with Seoul, which has no power to lift economic sanctions or persuade Washington to abandon the ultimate goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea.

However, the South’s Presidential Blue House said on February 26 that it will continue to make efforts to “open a future of mutual prosperity where the South and the North coexist peacefully and prosper together.”

The Congress completed the election of the Ninth Central Leadership, unanimously re-electing Kim as the general secretary of the WPK. The subsequent first enlarged plenary meeting finalized a leadership structure focused on stability and loyalty. Kim Yo Jong’s return to the Political Bureau as an alternate member, coupled with her promotion to a full department director, reaffirmed her status as the most trusted confidante and executive messenger for her brother’s aggressive external policies.

While Kim Ju Ae, Kim Jong Un’s daughter and presumed heir, remained absent from the Ninth Congress, this was largely expected given her age; believed to be born in 2013, she has yet to reach the age of 18 required for party membership. Analysts suggest that her official debut within the WPK framework is more likely to occur at the 10th Congress five years from now, once she meets the structural requirements for political participation. In the coming years, according to analysis by the South Korean National Intelligence Service, Kim Ju Ae will likely appear in the North’s media frequently by taking more functional roles, considering her status as a de facto successor of Kim Jong Un.

The Ninth Congress solidified a “Neo-Cold War” structure on the Korean Peninsula, pitting the trilateral cooperation of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan against a burgeoning northern bloc of North Korea, China, and Russia. As Pyongyang’s diplomatic options toward Washington and Seoul became severely restricted, Kim Jong Un doubled down on strategic partnerships with Moscow and Beijing to circumvent international isolation. The Congress’ emphasis on expanding relations with “anti-imperialist independent countries” served as a prelude to deeper military and technological cooperation with Russia, likely involving the exchange of conventional munitions for advanced aerospace components.

The geopolitical realignment on the Korean Peninsula has led to the functional paralysis of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). With Russia and China – both permanent members with veto power – increasingly aligned with Pyongyang’s interests, the prospect of new international sanctions or unified condemnation effectively vanished. The Ninth Congress reflected that Pyongyang was confident in this systemic failure, recognizing that the polarized world provides a sanctuary where international laws and sanctions could no longer reach.

Consequently, the international community will gradually face a new reality where the role of international institutions in managing nuclear proliferation reaches its limit. The failure of the UNSC to enforce sanctions due to the diverging interests of its permanent members suggests that regional stability would no longer be regulated by international law, but rather by the precarious balance of power and mutual deterrence. 

As North Korea enters its new five-year plan under the Ninth Central Committee’s leadership, it does so as a self-declared nuclear power thriving within the cracks of a fractured global order.

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The Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), which concluded its final session on February 25, fundamentally reordered the geopolitical framework of the Korean Peninsula. Through a comprehensive review of the party’s strategic direction, Kim Jong Un, the autocratic leader of North Korea, formalized the permanent severance of ties with South Korea and institutionalized a high-tech nuclear doctrine for the newly elected WPK leadership. 

The Ninth Congress – held for seven days from February 19 to 25 – served as a definitive proclamation that North Korea has moved beyond the era of nuclear aspiration, cementing its status as a permanent nuclear-armed state with an operationalized arsenal.

A pivotal outcome of the Congress was the formalization of “Haekpangasoe,” translated literally as “nuclear trigger.” In the report on the Ninth Congress released by Korean Central News Agency, North Korea’s state media outlet, Haekpangasoe represented an integrated nuclear crisis response system designed to ensure that the national nuclear shield could be operated promptly and accurately at any moment. 

By utilizing the term “trigger,” Pyongyang signaled a shift toward a more automated and responsive command-and-control structure, aimed at ensuring sensitive responsiveness to perceived threats. The technological upgrading of North Korea’s nuclear force effectively shifted the mission of the nuclear deterrent to include pre-emptive strike capabilities as stipulated by national law.

The report also detailed a new long-term national defense plan involving the introduction of AI-driven unmanned weapons and special assets for neutralizing enemy satellites. The mass deployment of 600 mm and new-type 240 mm multiple rocket launchers was designated as the primary means for deterring targets within the territory of South Korea. According to Pyongyang, its military modernization effort is a strategic necessity to neutralize the pressure from the United States and its regional allies.

Beyond military doctrine, the Ninth Congress laid out the “2026-2030 National Economic Development Five-Year Plan,” with a focus on total self-reliance and agricultural stability. The WPK set an ambitious annual grain production target of 9.5 million tons by 2030, supported by the planned reclamation of 300,000 hectares of tideland. This emphasis on food sovereignty is not merely a domestic policy but a prerequisite for the regime’s “two-state” stance. By aiming for agricultural autarky, Pyongyang seeks to eliminate any need for South Korean humanitarian aid, thereby reinforcing its permanent severance from Seoul. 

In the industrial sector, the goal to increase steel and chemical fiber production by 150 percent further demonstrates a strategic shift toward a siege economy capable of withstanding prolonged isolation. Simultaneously, North Korea reinforced its ideological fortress by intensifying the Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law, specifically targeting the younger generation to insulate them from South Korean cultural influence and ensure absolute loyalty to the new two-state narrative.

The Ninth Congress marked the final and legal termination of 80 years of inter-Korean relations. Pyongyang officially defined South Korea as the “out-and-out first hostile state” and the “immutable principal enemy,” a move that effectively discarded long-standing policies based on ethnic solidarity or the pursuit of national reunification. North Korea also confirmed that all channels and spaces of contact in the southern border areas were physically blocked and were being militarily fortified. The shift toward a hostile “two-state” relationship led to the dissolution of various state organs and agencies in North Korea that had been tasked with inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation.

The North’s strategic shift solidified the “relations between two hostile states” first declared by Kim Jong Un during the WPK’s year-end plenary meeting in late 2023. By formally adopting this stance at the Ninth Congress, North Korea transformed what was once a rhetorical declaration into a permanent and constitutional pillar of its national policy.

Pyongyang’s consistent antagonism toward Seoul can be viewed as Kim’s attempt to justify preemptive military action and insulate the North Korean populace from the South’s cultural influence. Kim also made clear that he sees no reason to negotiate with Seoul, which has no power to lift economic sanctions or persuade Washington to abandon the ultimate goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea.

However, the South’s Presidential Blue House said on February 26 that it will continue to make efforts to “open a future of mutual prosperity where the South and the North coexist peacefully and prosper together.”

The Congress completed the election of the Ninth Central Leadership, unanimously re-electing Kim as the general secretary of the WPK. The subsequent first enlarged plenary meeting finalized a leadership structure focused on stability and loyalty. Kim Yo Jong’s return to the Political Bureau as an alternate member, coupled with her promotion to a full department director, reaffirmed her status as the most trusted confidante and executive messenger for her brother’s aggressive external policies.

While Kim Ju Ae, Kim Jong Un’s daughter and presumed heir, remained absent from the Ninth Congress, this was largely expected given her age; believed to be born in 2013, she has yet to reach the age of 18 required for party membership. Analysts suggest that her official debut within the WPK framework is more likely to occur at the 10th Congress five years from now, once she meets the structural requirements for political participation. In the coming years, according to analysis by the South Korean National Intelligence Service, Kim Ju Ae will likely appear in the North’s media frequently by taking more functional roles, considering her status as a de facto successor of Kim Jong Un.

The Ninth Congress solidified a “Neo-Cold War” structure on the Korean Peninsula, pitting the trilateral cooperation of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan against a burgeoning northern bloc of North Korea, China, and Russia. As Pyongyang’s diplomatic options toward Washington and Seoul became severely restricted, Kim Jong Un doubled down on strategic partnerships with Moscow and Beijing to circumvent international isolation. The Congress’ emphasis on expanding relations with “anti-imperialist independent countries” served as a prelude to deeper military and technological cooperation with Russia, likely involving the exchange of conventional munitions for advanced aerospace components.

The geopolitical realignment on the Korean Peninsula has led to the functional paralysis of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). With Russia and China – both permanent members with veto power – increasingly aligned with Pyongyang’s interests, the prospect of new international sanctions or unified condemnation effectively vanished. The Ninth Congress reflected that Pyongyang was confident in this systemic failure, recognizing that the polarized world provides a sanctuary where international laws and sanctions could no longer reach.

Consequently, the international community will gradually face a new reality where the role of international institutions in managing nuclear proliferation reaches its limit. The failure of the UNSC to enforce sanctions due to the diverging interests of its permanent members suggests that regional stability would no longer be regulated by international law, but rather by the precarious balance of power and mutual deterrence. 

As North Korea enters its new five-year plan under the Ninth Central Committee’s leadership, it does so as a self-declared nuclear power thriving within the cracks of a fractured global order.

Mitch Shin is a chief correspondent for The Diplomat, covering the Korean Peninsula. He is also a non-resident research fellow at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies and associate fellow for the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

Inter-Korean relations

North Korea 9th Party Congress

North Korea foreign policy

North Korea military modernization

North Korea nuclear doctrine

North Korea nuclear state

North Korea two-state theory

Workers Party of North Korea

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