The Koreas | Politics | East Asia

Kim Jong Un’s Ninth Party Congress Personnel Shakeup

The generational shift that the Ninth Party Congress signaled is noticeable: Kim’s old mentors and advisors inside the regime have stepped aside – whether willingly or not – to make room for his allies and new prospects. 

In this photo provided by North Korea state media, delegates listen as Kim Jong Un gives a speech at the concluding session of the Ninth Party Congress, Feb. 24, 2026.

North Korea began its once-every-five-years party congress last week, bringing together thousands of the most important party, government, military, and state-run industry officials for a multiday series of meetings. Historically, the congress of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) has served to set the regime’s long-term policy agenda and consolidate power atop the government. While the Ninth Party Congress’s policy direction is still coming into focus, one conclusion is already clear: Kim Jong Un did not waste the chance to reinforce his political position through significant personnel changes.

The Ninth Party Congress once again produced a notable shakeup atop the regime, which will subsequently extend across the government. The Kim regime swapped out more than 40 percent of the WPK Central Committee members, elevating generational and institutional allies while sidelining several high-profile figures. The precise drivers of this turnover – age, purges, or policy recalibration – remain unclear, but the composition of those departing and those ascending offers key insight into the evolving political dynamics in Pyongyang.

North Korean Government Postings

To assess the breadth and significance of these personnel moves, it is necessary to understand the architecture of North Korea’s government system.

Three core institutions sit at the apex of governance: the WPK, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), and the Cabinet. Under Kim Il Sung, the party dominated the system, leveraging the party infrastructure to impose controls across the nation. To secure his own succession and consolidate authority, Kim Jong Il elevated the KPA through the songun (“military first”) policy, reshaping elite hierarchies in the process.

Under Kim Jong Un, the power balance shifted back to the WPK. The regime leveraged party mechanisms to legitimize Kim Jong Un’s accession as the country’s leader, and he has since reasserted the WPK’s policy- and decision-making functions atop the government. As such, party organizations like the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Central Military Commission have all become core pieces within the mechanics of the North Korean government. 

By implication, the WPK becomes the place where key personnel first receive their appointments. Several are then granted important positions within the Cabinet, be it as the premier, a Cabinet minister, or any of the numerous official billets. The opposite is also true: if a person is removed from key party appointments during the Congress, they tend to lose their Cabinet postings as well. This is how the personnel reshuffle in the Ninth Party Congress will have reverberations across the entire North Korean central government.

Of the 138 sitting Central Committee members (not counting Kim Jong Un), a total of 40 percent were replaced. A logical question that follows is whether this tracks with precedent. It is only really possible to compare the Seventh (held in 2016), Eighth (2021), and Ninth Party Congresses to one another because Kim Jong Il did not use Party Congresses and the Kim Il Sung era was functionally different. In this case, turnover was lower than the 66 percent changeover that happened between the Seventh and Eighth Party Congresses.

Perhaps more important than the scope of the turnover was some of the notable individuals who were left out of the Ninth Central Committee.

Choe Ryong Hae, a longtime member of Kim Jong Un’s inner circle and one of the regime’s most senior officials, was not appointed to the Ninth Central Committee. His omission is particularly striking given his family’s revolutionary ties, his decades-long service, and his role as a trusted political operator bridging party and military institutions. It is also worth noting that he is rumored to be the father-in-law of Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong. 

Ri Pyong Chol, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and a key figure in North Korea’s missile development efforts, also did not receive a nod to remain in the Central Committee. Ri has often appeared alongside Kim during weapons tests and military parades alike, and he is reportedly related to Kim Jong Un’s wife, Ri Sol Ju.

Kim Yong Chol, a former KPA general widely viewed as an architect of the 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong-do, likewise did not make the new Central Committee list. After serving as the North Korean representative to inter-Korean military talks, Kim Yong Chol later transitioned to diplomatic roles, positioning himself as an interlocutor during the 2018-2019 period of diplomacy with South Korea and the United States.

Similarly, Ri Son Gwon – another former KPA general linked to the 2010 provocations – is out. Ri had briefly served as foreign minister and headed the United Front Department, North Korea’s primary inter-Korean engagement body. Guerrilla reporting from inside North Korea suggested a........

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