The Koreas | Politics | East Asia

Kim Jong Un’s Ninth Party Congress Personnel Shakeup

The generational shift that the Ninth Party Congress signaled is noticeable: Kim’s old mentors and advisors inside the regime have stepped aside – whether willingly or not – to make room for his allies and new prospects. 

In this photo provided by North Korea state media, delegates listen as Kim Jong Un gives a speech at the concluding session of the Ninth Party Congress, Feb. 24, 2026.

North Korea began its once-every-five-years party congress last week, bringing together thousands of the most important party, government, military, and state-run industry officials for a multiday series of meetings. Historically, the congress of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) has served to set the regime’s long-term policy agenda and consolidate power atop the government. While the Ninth Party Congress’s policy direction is still coming into focus, one conclusion is already clear: Kim Jong Un did not waste the chance to reinforce his political position through significant personnel changes.

The Ninth Party Congress once again produced a notable shakeup atop the regime, which will subsequently extend across the government. The Kim regime swapped out more than 40 percent of the WPK Central Committee members, elevating generational and institutional allies while sidelining several high-profile figures. The precise drivers of this turnover – age, purges, or policy recalibration – remain unclear, but the composition of those departing and those ascending offers key insight into the evolving political dynamics in Pyongyang.

North Korean Government Postings

To assess the breadth and significance of these personnel moves, it is necessary to understand the architecture of North Korea’s government system.

Three core institutions sit at the apex of governance: the WPK, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), and the Cabinet. Under Kim Il Sung, the party dominated the system, leveraging the party infrastructure to impose controls across the nation. To secure his own succession and consolidate authority, Kim Jong Il elevated the KPA through the songun (“military first”) policy, reshaping elite hierarchies in the process.

Under Kim Jong Un, the power balance shifted back to the WPK. The regime leveraged party mechanisms to legitimize Kim Jong Un’s accession as the country’s leader, and he has since reasserted the WPK’s policy- and decision-making functions atop the government. As such, party organizations like the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Central Military Commission have all become core pieces within the mechanics of the North Korean government. 

By implication, the WPK becomes the place where key personnel first receive their appointments. Several are then granted important positions within the Cabinet, be it as the premier, a Cabinet minister, or any of the numerous official billets. The opposite is also true: if a person is removed from key party appointments during the Congress, they tend to lose their Cabinet postings as well. This is how the personnel reshuffle in the Ninth Party Congress will have reverberations across the entire North Korean central government.

Of the 138 sitting Central Committee members (not counting Kim Jong Un), a total of 40 percent were replaced. A logical question that follows is whether this tracks with precedent. It is only really possible to compare the Seventh (held in 2016), Eighth (2021), and Ninth Party Congresses to one another because Kim Jong Il did not use Party Congresses and the Kim Il Sung era was functionally different. In this case, turnover was lower than the 66 percent changeover that happened between the Seventh and Eighth Party Congresses.

Perhaps more important than the scope of the turnover was some of the notable individuals who were left out of the Ninth Central Committee.

Choe Ryong Hae, a longtime member of Kim Jong Un’s inner circle and one of the regime’s most senior officials, was not appointed to the Ninth Central Committee. His omission is particularly striking given his family’s revolutionary ties, his decades-long service, and his role as a trusted political operator bridging party and military institutions. It is also worth noting that he is rumored to be the father-in-law of Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong. 

Ri Pyong Chol, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and a key figure in North Korea’s missile development efforts, also did not receive a nod to remain in the Central Committee. Ri has often appeared alongside Kim during weapons tests and military parades alike, and he is reportedly related to Kim Jong Un’s wife, Ri Sol Ju.

Kim Yong Chol, a former KPA general widely viewed as an architect of the 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong-do, likewise did not make the new Central Committee list. After serving as the North Korean representative to inter-Korean military talks, Kim Yong Chol later transitioned to diplomatic roles, positioning himself as an interlocutor during the 2018-2019 period of diplomacy with South Korea and the United States.

Similarly, Ri Son Gwon – another former KPA general linked to the 2010 provocations – is out. Ri had briefly served as foreign minister and headed the United Front Department, North Korea’s primary inter-Korean engagement body. Guerrilla reporting from inside North Korea suggested a significant rivalry between Ri and North Korea’s current foreign minister, Choe Son Hui. Choe’s retention atop the government and Ri’s departure indicate which rival came out on top.

Three factors likely explain the reshuffle.

The first is age. Several of the departing officials are in their late 70s or older. North Korea is not immune to generational turnover, particularly as Kim seeks to align the elite class with his long-term policy objectives. Replacing aging revolutionaries and older-generation political operators with younger cadre strengthens regime durability.

The second explanation is purges. While not all removals are indicative of punishment, some undoubtedly reflect discipline or political sidelining. Without additional indicators, it remains difficult to determine how many who failed to receive appointments were victims of internal power struggles.

Third is policy recalibration. The Congress will produce new five-year plans for economic management, military modernization, and diplomatic maneuvering, among other issues. This personnel shakeup will invariably reflect at least some of the government’s efforts to position the right people for implementing these long-term policy agendas.

There are many new faces elevated to the highest echelons of government, but the ones who demand the most immediate attention are Kim Jong Un’s core allies. They can be broken into two groups: generational and institutional.

Generational allies are those who are in Kim Jong Un’s demographic. These are individuals who came up together and are tied more by personal relationship than by organizational ties. 

The most notable of which is Kim Jong Un’s right-hand man, Jo Yong Won. Jo has appeared in state media alongside Kim Jong Un for a decade, and he already earned the nod to be secretary of the Central Committee. At the Ninth Party Congress, he received the distinction of joining the Party Presidium – the highest group of officials within the WPK structure.

Then there is Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s younger sister. Many observers have claimed she has been involved in a power struggle for succession. Far greater evidence points to Kim Yo Jong being a trusted confidant of Kim Jong Un who can adapt to myriad roles on behalf of the regime, be it as the lead for North Korea’s charm offensive in 2018 or as the mouthpiece for protest since 2020. In the Ninth Party Congress, Kim Yo Jong earned an appointment as a Central Committee member, designation as an alternate member of the Politburo, and a promotion from vice director to full-fledged department director inside the WPK.

The elevation of generational allies like these two reinforces a political class whose careers are inseparable from Kim Jong Un’s own trajectory. It extends the levers of power to those confidants as the regime seeks to move forward with long-term policy implementation.

Along with generational allies are institutional ones. These are the people whom Kim Jong Un has come to know and trust over the years, like Kim Jae Ryong, Ri Il Hwan, and Jong Kyong Thaek. The prominence of these individuals in state media has ebbed and flowed over time, but they always seem to reemerge at even higher positions after absences. 

In the Ninth Party Congress, each one of these institutional allies saw their positions elevated. Kim Jae Ryong and Ri Il Hwan both join Jo Yong Won as members of the Party Presidium. Meanwhile, Jong Kyong Thaek got the nod to become vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, which is the de facto number two military official in the government (higher than the nominal position of Minister of National Defense).

What to Make of the Reshuffles

It is impossible to know all the inner workings of these personnel moves, but there are a couple of takeaways – some possible, and one definite. 

First  the reshuffles suggest that the system of managing party elites remains faithfully intact. The willingness to swap out a sizable portion of the Central Committee and introduce a new cadre of leaders in senior-most positions indicates as much.

It could signal a new policy direction, but there is not yet enough information to discern this. While some will debate whether personalities matter all that much in North Korea’s policy formulation and implementation, there are plenty of examples where interpersonal rivalries, preferences toward external powers like China, or personal competency can all affect outcomes for the Kim regime. This warrants further observation.

But the most important takeaway from these personnel moves is that Kim Jong Un’s reign is definitively entering its next phase. Kim’s old mentors and advisors inside the regime have stepped aside – whether willingly or not – to make room for his allies and new prospects. While some of the old guard will invariably remain, the generational shift that the Ninth Party Congress signaled is noticeable. Kim Jong Un is no longer leading as a young successor consolidating control, but as a mature operator shaping the political class that will define the durability of his system of governance.

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North Korea began its once-every-five-years party congress last week, bringing together thousands of the most important party, government, military, and state-run industry officials for a multiday series of meetings. Historically, the congress of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) has served to set the regime’s long-term policy agenda and consolidate power atop the government. While the Ninth Party Congress’s policy direction is still coming into focus, one conclusion is already clear: Kim Jong Un did not waste the chance to reinforce his political position through significant personnel changes.

The Ninth Party Congress once again produced a notable shakeup atop the regime, which will subsequently extend across the government. The Kim regime swapped out more than 40 percent of the WPK Central Committee members, elevating generational and institutional allies while sidelining several high-profile figures. The precise drivers of this turnover – age, purges, or policy recalibration – remain unclear, but the composition of those departing and those ascending offers key insight into the evolving political dynamics in Pyongyang.

North Korean Government Postings

To assess the breadth and significance of these personnel moves, it is necessary to understand the architecture of North Korea’s government system.

Three core institutions sit at the apex of governance: the WPK, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), and the Cabinet. Under Kim Il Sung, the party dominated the system, leveraging the party infrastructure to impose controls across the nation. To secure his own succession and consolidate authority, Kim Jong Il elevated the KPA through the songun (“military first”) policy, reshaping elite hierarchies in the process.

Under Kim Jong Un, the power balance shifted back to the WPK. The regime leveraged party mechanisms to legitimize Kim Jong Un’s accession as the country’s leader, and he has since reasserted the WPK’s policy- and decision-making functions atop the government. As such, party organizations like the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Central Military Commission have all become core pieces within the mechanics of the North Korean government. 

By implication, the WPK becomes the place where key personnel first receive their appointments. Several are then granted important positions within the Cabinet, be it as the premier, a Cabinet minister, or any of the numerous official billets. The opposite is also true: if a person is removed from key party appointments during the Congress, they tend to lose their Cabinet postings as well. This is how the personnel reshuffle in the Ninth Party Congress will have reverberations across the entire North Korean central government.

Of the 138 sitting Central Committee members (not counting Kim Jong Un), a total of 40 percent were replaced. A logical question that follows is whether this tracks with precedent. It is only really possible to compare the Seventh (held in 2016), Eighth (2021), and Ninth Party Congresses to one another because Kim Jong Il did not use Party Congresses and the Kim Il Sung era was functionally different. In this case, turnover was lower than the 66 percent changeover that happened between the Seventh and Eighth Party Congresses.

Perhaps more important than the scope of the turnover was some of the notable individuals who were left out of the Ninth Central Committee.

Choe Ryong Hae, a longtime member of Kim Jong Un’s inner circle and one of the regime’s most senior officials, was not appointed to the Ninth Central Committee. His omission is particularly striking given his family’s revolutionary ties, his decades-long service, and his role as a trusted political operator bridging party and military institutions. It is also worth noting that he is rumored to be the father-in-law of Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong. 

Ri Pyong Chol, a former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and a key figure in North Korea’s missile development efforts, also did not receive a nod to remain in the Central Committee. Ri has often appeared alongside Kim during weapons tests and military parades alike, and he is reportedly related to Kim Jong Un’s wife, Ri Sol Ju.

Kim Yong Chol, a former KPA general widely viewed as an architect of the 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong-do, likewise did not make the new Central Committee list. After serving as the North Korean representative to inter-Korean military talks, Kim Yong Chol later transitioned to diplomatic roles, positioning himself as an interlocutor during the 2018-2019 period of diplomacy with South Korea and the United States.

Similarly, Ri Son Gwon – another former KPA general linked to the 2010 provocations – is out. Ri had briefly served as foreign minister and headed the United Front Department, North Korea’s primary inter-Korean engagement body. Guerrilla reporting from inside North Korea suggested a significant rivalry between Ri and North Korea’s current foreign minister, Choe Son Hui. Choe’s retention atop the government and Ri’s departure indicate which rival came out on top.

Three factors likely explain the reshuffle.

The first is age. Several of the departing officials are in their late 70s or older. North Korea is not immune to generational turnover, particularly as Kim seeks to align the elite class with his long-term policy objectives. Replacing aging revolutionaries and older-generation political operators with younger cadre strengthens regime durability.

The second explanation is purges. While not all removals are indicative of punishment, some undoubtedly reflect discipline or political sidelining. Without additional indicators, it remains difficult to determine how many who failed to receive appointments were victims of internal power struggles.

Third is policy recalibration. The Congress will produce new five-year plans for economic management, military modernization, and diplomatic maneuvering, among other issues. This personnel shakeup will invariably reflect at least some of the government’s efforts to position the right people for implementing these long-term policy agendas.

There are many new faces elevated to the highest echelons of government, but the ones who demand the most immediate attention are Kim Jong Un’s core allies. They can be broken into two groups: generational and institutional.

Generational allies are those who are in Kim Jong Un’s demographic. These are individuals who came up together and are tied more by personal relationship than by organizational ties. 

The most notable of which is Kim Jong Un’s right-hand man, Jo Yong Won. Jo has appeared in state media alongside Kim Jong Un for a decade, and he already earned the nod to be secretary of the Central Committee. At the Ninth Party Congress, he received the distinction of joining the Party Presidium – the highest group of officials within the WPK structure.

Then there is Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s younger sister. Many observers have claimed she has been involved in a power struggle for succession. Far greater evidence points to Kim Yo Jong being a trusted confidant of Kim Jong Un who can adapt to myriad roles on behalf of the regime, be it as the lead for North Korea’s charm offensive in 2018 or as the mouthpiece for protest since 2020. In the Ninth Party Congress, Kim Yo Jong earned an appointment as a Central Committee member, designation as an alternate member of the Politburo, and a promotion from vice director to full-fledged department director inside the WPK.

The elevation of generational allies like these two reinforces a political class whose careers are inseparable from Kim Jong Un’s own trajectory. It extends the levers of power to those confidants as the regime seeks to move forward with long-term policy implementation.

Along with generational allies are institutional ones. These are the people whom Kim Jong Un has come to know and trust over the years, like Kim Jae Ryong, Ri Il Hwan, and Jong Kyong Thaek. The prominence of these individuals in state media has ebbed and flowed over time, but they always seem to reemerge at even higher positions after absences. 

In the Ninth Party Congress, each one of these institutional allies saw their positions elevated. Kim Jae Ryong and Ri Il Hwan both join Jo Yong Won as members of the Party Presidium. Meanwhile, Jong Kyong Thaek got the nod to become vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, which is the de facto number two military official in the government (higher than the nominal position of Minister of National Defense).

What to Make of the Reshuffles

It is impossible to know all the inner workings of these personnel moves, but there are a couple of takeaways – some possible, and one definite. 

First  the reshuffles suggest that the system of managing party elites remains faithfully intact. The willingness to swap out a sizable portion of the Central Committee and introduce a new cadre of leaders in senior-most positions indicates as much.

It could signal a new policy direction, but there is not yet enough information to discern this. While some will debate whether personalities matter all that much in North Korea’s policy formulation and implementation, there are plenty of examples where interpersonal rivalries, preferences toward external powers like China, or personal competency can all affect outcomes for the Kim regime. This warrants further observation.

But the most important takeaway from these personnel moves is that Kim Jong Un’s reign is definitively entering its next phase. Kim’s old mentors and advisors inside the regime have stepped aside – whether willingly or not – to make room for his allies and new prospects. While some of the old guard will invariably remain, the generational shift that the Ninth Party Congress signaled is noticeable. Kim Jong Un is no longer leading as a young successor consolidating control, but as a mature operator shaping the political class that will define the durability of his system of governance.

Michael MacArthur Bosack

Michael MacArthur Bosack is the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative and the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served as the deputy secretary of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea and the deputy chief of government relations at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan. You can follow him on X (Twitter) @MikeBosack.

North Korea 9th Party Congress

North Korea Party Congress

Workers Party of North Korea

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