Interviews | Diplomacy | East Asia

The Limits – and Dangers – of the China-Russia Partnership

Insights from Mathieu Boulègue. 

The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Mathieu Boulègue – senior fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and co-author of “The China-Russia Meta Threat: The Architecture of Authoritarian Power” (CEPA 2026) – is the 518th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”

How have China-Russia relations changed since the start of the Ukraine war in 2022?

I think the relationship evolved significantly after 2014 and Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, rather than in 2022 per se, after the full-scale invasion. The weight of international sanctions and Moscow’s growing isolation pushed Russia closer to China. This consequently forced the Kremlin to replace Western dependence with dependence on Beijing and effectively created a new form of over-reliance. 

Over-reliance applies to economic subsidies, investments, and in the military sphere, to the procurement – legal and illegal – of dual-use and military technology, spare parts, and equipment. Supply chain dependency is particularly evident in microelectronics, semiconductors, circuitry, and machine-building tools used to sustain Russia’s war machine. Now the issue for Moscow is that trading one dependence for another is not ideal, but they don’t have much choice but to court China for continued support. 

Examine the “asymmetric interdependence” of China-Russia economic relations. 

The report we recently published underscores the idea that Russia can only be a “junior partner” to China, and never an equal. No amount of great power propaganda from either side can hide the fact that Russia needs China more than China needs Russia. 

Such a relationship, far from being “no limit,” is also quite fragile. The Russian leadership is perfectly aware of the increasingly asymmetric nature of bilateral relations. Meanwhile, Beijing must navigate the intricacies of using Russia as a barking dog while avoiding antagonizing Moscow or bruising Putin’s ego. Call it genuine authoritarian diplomacy. 

Military cooperation might be the area where Russia is the least dwarfed by China, mainly because Beijing is in a listen-and-learn mode. 

Analyze the “parallel play” nature of military cooperation between China and Russia.

“Parallel play” is an interesting concept, reflecting how kids in early childhood tend to play side by side but never fully together. I think it illustrates precisely how Russia and China approach military cooperation at large – interaction without the full extent of actual interaction. 

Western analyses generally tend to assume Russia-China military relations should take the form of what we see at NATO level for instance, and we tend to placate known concepts of cooperation such as “interoperability” or “strategic alliances.” Beijing and Moscow don’t need any of that to have meaningful military cooperation. 

Western-style interoperability is not something they are trying to replicate. They........

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