ASEAN Beat | Security | Southeast Asia

How Vietnam’s ‘Four Nos’ Can Help a Region Manage the U.S. Rogue Use of Force

The country’s preference for an open and predicable international order is shared by most of its Asian neighbors.

Vietnamese soldiers march in a parade marking the 50th anniversary of the fall of Saigon in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, April 30, 2025.

The U.S. war against Iran is teaching Vietnam two important lessons in real time. First, it shows Vietnam the limits of U.S. military power. Iran, despite being surrounded by U.S. allies and possessing an inferior navy and air force, has still been able to close the Strait of Hormuz and survive politically in the face of massive U.S. bombardments. The United States has little chance of victory were it to attempt to challenge China’s much more sophisticated arsenal.

Second, it demonstrates to Hanoi how fragile the liberal international order is now that the United States has decided to undermine its principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and open trade. Washington’s “enshitification” of the international order to extort allies and partners for money and influence raises Hanoi’s skepticism of U.S. sincerity as a trade and security partner.

The U.S. conduct confirms the validity of Hanoi’s “Four Nos” policy of no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, no foreign military bases, and no use of Vietnamese territory to oppose other countries, no use of force or threats to use force in international relations. (The fourth “no” was added in 2019). The U.S. use of its Middle East bases to bomb Iran has invited Iranian retaliation against critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, and disturbed these countries’ delicate balance between Washington and Tehran. Even faraway allies such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia have been criticized for not helping reopen the Strait of Hormuz. By neither allying with the United States nor granting its access to bases, Vietnam simultaneously ensures that it will not be the target of Chinese retaliation and entrapped in U.S. operations elsewhere.

Washington’s rogue use of force now requires Hanoi to be even more proactive with its Four Nos. Vietnam’s economic development needs a predictable and open international order. The Four Nos should no longer be viewed just as a policy of self-restraint but also as a measure to restrain Hanoi’s neighbors and prevent them from coalescing into rival military blocs due to the U.S. disregard for the international order. This requires an expansion of the Four Nos beyond Vietnam’s territory. Vietnam’s goal should be straightforward: requiring all its neighbors and diplomatic partners to adhere to the Four Nos in their bilateral exchanges.

Vietnam came up with its “Three Nos” in response to the collapse of the Soviet-led order in 1991. During the Third Indochina War (1978-1991), Hanoi granted the Soviet Union access to Cam Ranh Naval Base, which Moscow could use to monitor China and Southeast Asia. At the same time, Vietnam’s military presence in Laos and Cambodia denied China the ability to attack Vietnam from the west. However, Vietnam’s neighbors saw its conduct and its alliance with the Soviet Union as a threat, which led them to use military, economic, and diplomatic pressure to force Hanoi to stop the use of others’ territories or let others use Vietnamese territory for military purposes.

Due to declining Soviet backing after 1986, Hanoi had to withdraw troops from Laos and Cambodia in 1988 and 1989, respectively. At the same time, the Soviet Union also withdrew its fighters and bombers from Vietnam and reduced its presence at Cam Ranh. Since its formal adoption in 1998, Vietnam has treated the Three Nos, and later the Four Nos, as the core of its defense policy and an affirmation of its pledge under the 1991 Paris Agreement not to send troops to Cambodia again. After Russia’s lease of the naval base expired in 2004, Hanoi has refused to let foreign navies station permanently there. Restraining........

© The Diplomat