Flashpoints | Security | East Asia

When the Davidson Window Meets the ‘Xi Window’

The Davidson Window measures China’s military capability to invade Taiwan. Arguably more important is Xi Jinping’s confidence in his military.

In March 2021, Admiral Philip S. Davidson, then commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Beijing was accelerating its ambition to supplant the United States and its leadership role in the rules-based international order. Davidson warned that China appeared to be moving forward the timeline for goals it had long said it hoped to achieve by around 2050. Seizing Taiwan, he assessed, was clearly one of Beijing’s major objectives before then, and the threat could manifest during the 2020s, possibly within the next six years.

Davidson’s written testimony also noted that Beijing had announced plans to accelerate military modernization in time for the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) centennial in 2027. Since then, 2027 has become an important marker in debates over PLA capabilities and the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

But the so-called “Davidson window” should not be read as a war calendar.

Davidson’s comments were initially interpreted by media outlets and analysts as suggesting that 2027 was China’s timetable for using force against Taiwan. U.S. intelligence assessments have since made that interpretation more cautious. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stated that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027 and do not have a fixed timeline for achieving unification.

Former CIA Director William J. Burns made a similar distinction. He said U.S. intelligence indicated that Xi Jinping had instructed the PLA to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan. But Burns also emphasized that this did not mean Xi had decided to invade in 2027, or in any other specific year.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 report on China’s military development pointed in a similar direction. Beijing’s pressure campaign against Taiwan is not limited to military preparations for a full-scale invasion. It combines diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools to advance unification objectives below the threshold of war. The report also discussed “coercion short of war” as a possible Chinese option, including limited military actions, economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, information manipulation, and cognitive warfare designed to force Taiwan into negotiations or political concessions.

Of particular concern is the possibility of a joint blockade campaign. China could use air and maritime blockades to cut off Taiwan’s critical imports, while combining those measures with electronic warfare, cyberattacks, and information operations to compel Taiwan to negotiate or surrender.

Taken together, these assessments suggest that Beijing is more likely, at least for now, to keep shaping conditions for eventual cross-strait unification through measures below the threshold of armed conflict rather than immediately launching a full-scale invasion. 

For Taiwan, the more immediate danger is therefore not necessarily a sudden full-scale war in a specific year. It is the continued maturation of Beijing’s ability to coerce Taiwan into talks through gray-zone pressure.

The “Davidson window” is best understood as a “capability window.” It does not identify a date by which war must occur. It marks the point at which Beijing’s military power, combined with multiple instruments of coercion, may become increasingly useful for applying pressure against Taiwan.

Yet military capability alone is not enough to assess the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait. The PLA does not decide on its own whether to fight. The final decision rests with Xi Jinping.

This means another window must be considered alongside the “Davidson window”: a “confidence window.” This refers to Xi’s confidence in the PLA’s loyalty, command structure, equipment, and real combat effectiveness to achieve his objective. It can be called the “Xi window.”

The “Davidson window” asks whether the PLA is ready to fight. The “Xi window”........

© The Diplomat