Flashpoints | Diplomacy | East Asia

Does Reliance on China Undermine Iran’s Grand Strategy?

China’s interests in the Middle East increasingly conflict with Iran’s cooperation with regional proxies and use of coercive threats.

For more than four decades, the Islamic Republic has pursued a cohesive grand strategy, seeking regime survival, resistance to U.S. pressure, and political independence. It has accomplished this through an array of means, particularly its “forward defense” posture, which used regional proxies and partners to deter attacks and keep conflict away from Iran. It has used coercive threats, particularly against shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, combined with periodic diplomacy to generate leverage against stronger adversaries. To alleviate international isolation, Iran has also developed closer ties with China, Russia, and other powers. Together, these efforts have enabled Iran to compensate for its conventional military inferiority and maintain significant regional influence.

China has become particularly important within this strategic calculus. It is now Iran’s largest trading partner and a crucial economic lifeline amid U.S. sanctions, purchasing more than 80 percent of the country’s seaborne oil exports in 2025. However, the relationship remains highly asymmetric, as Iranian crude accounted for only around 13 percent of China’s seaborne oil imports that year. China also maintains extensive commercial relationships with other Gulf states and has avoided making formal security commitments to the Islamic Republic.

Direct confrontation with the U.S. has prompted competing assessments of the future of Iranian grand strategy. Some observers argue wartime adaptations have produced a more assertive and coherent strategy for the Islamic Republic, while others express skepticism about whether these changes have yielded meaningful gains.

However, these perspectives overlook a growing contradiction in Iran’s strategic posture. Regime survival remains Iran’s primary objective, but the means it has traditionally relied upon are complicated by growing dependence on China. This exacerbates issues that were already beginning to emerge amid the current conflict. Although China has assisted the Islamic Republic in withstanding U.S. economic pressure, its interests in the Middle East increasingly conflict with Iran’s cooperation with regional proxies and use of coercive threats. In the near term, this is likely to prompt the Islamic Republic to reconsider its relationship with China.

The Limits of Forward Defense

Iran’s regional network developed incrementally, allowing Iran to project power and maintain deterrence without relying solely on its own armed forces. It also afforded strategic depth, keeping regional conflicts away from Iran itself. The war exposed the limitations of this “forward defense” posture, as Hezbollah and other proxies failed to deter U.S. and Israeli attacks and have been substantially weakened. The Houthis, however, retain the capacity to threaten Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

Sustaining and directing this network under wartime conditions has been immensely difficult for the Islamic Republic. Hezbollah’s ongoing reconstruction now imposes demands on Iranian military and financial resources. Rebuilding the organization has required greater involvement by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which reportedly supervised its military restructuring and provided substantial financial support. Rather than keeping threats at arm’s length, these commitments worsen the regime’s exposure and sap resources required to defend Iranian territory and rebuild its economy.

The Houthis present the opposite challenge, despite their recent success in Yemen. Their military capabilities and relative self-sufficiency potentially offer Iran greater regional leverage, but their advances have at times appeared to undermine Chinese interests. Following Houthi advances that exposed Saudi oil exports and maritime traffic to further disruption, China reportedly pressed Iran to restrain the rebel group. The Chinese representative to the United Nations also criticized attacks on civilian infrastructure amid the conflict in Yemen. Although China reportedly did not issue a specific threat to the Islamic Republic, the intervention demonstrates how even Iran’s more capable regional partners may complicate its interests elsewhere. It also demonstrates China’s willingness to pressure Iranian policymakers.

Threats to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz long provided the Islamic Republic with diplomatic leverage partly because they remained hypothetical. The war demonstrated Iran’s willingness to follow through with its threats, as its attacks have disrupted shipping and energy markets, and made reopening the strait an important bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States.

However, repeated disruption encourages Gulf exporters to invest in alternative routes, potentially........

© The Diplomat