South Korea’s Conservatives Are Running Out of Time
The Koreas | Politics | East Asia
South Korea’s Conservatives Are Running Out of Time
Adrift after Yoon’s impeachment, the PPP is facing the unthinkable: loss of support in its long-time base.
PPP Chair Jang Dong-hyeok attends a campaign event for the upcoming local elections, May 21, 2026.
South Koreans will head to the polls on June 3 to elect local councils, municipal authorities, metropolitan mayors, and provincial governors. Campaigning officially started on May 21. The vote represents the first nationwide political test since President Lee Jae-myung entered office following former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment and political collapse.
The election’s deeper significance lies not simply in whether the ruling Democratic Party (DP) performs well, but in whether South Korea’s conservative movement can still function as a credible national alternative after the Yoon era.
For decades, South Korean politics operated in a relatively stable framework. Conservatives and progressives competed fiercely, but the broader structure of political competition remained intact, reinforced by strong regional loyalties and a resilient two-party system. Conservatives traditionally dominated the southeastern Yeongnam region, while liberals maintained their base in the southwest. Governments changed, yet the country’s political geography rarely shifted dramatically.
Yoon’s declaration of martial law last year disrupted that equilibrium. The constitutional crisis and impeachment that followed severely damaged public trust in the conservative People Power Party (PPP), driving many centrist voters away from the party and consolidating support behind Lee’s newly elected administration.
Still, the PPP’s current crisis extends beyond ordinary electoral unpopularity. The party increasingly appears unable to define a coherent post-Yoon identity.
Rather than using impeachment as an opportunity to reconstruct a broader conservative coalition, the party leadership has struggled to distance itself from the former president and his most hardline supporters. Elements within the party continue to echo allegations of election fraud and other conspiratorial rhetoric that resonate with parts of the conservative base but alienate moderates essential for national competitiveness.
The result is a growing divide between reformists seeking ideological repositioning and pro-Yoon factions determined to preserve organizational control. That conflict has increasingly consumed the party itself. Internal disputes over leadership, disciplinary actions against reform-minded figures, and escalating factional tensions have reinforced the public perception of a party focused more on internal warfare than political reconstruction.
The controversy surrounding the PPP leadership’s hastily arranged visit to Washington in April further amplified that image. The trip, organized only weeks before a critical nationwide election, drew criticism even within conservative circles for appearing politically tone-deaf and lacking any clear diplomatic or strategic purpose. Widely circulated photographs of party leaders posing casually in front of the U.S. Capitol became symbolic, for many voters, of a leadership disconnected from domestic anxieties over inflation and economic stagnation.
That perception has created political openings for the DP far beyond its traditional strongholds. The clearest symbolic battleground is Daegu, long regarded as the capital of South Korean conservatism. Even modest erosion of conservative dominance there would have been politically unthinkable only a few years ago. The DP’s growing competitiveness in parts of the Yeongnam region does not necessarily indicate an ideological realignment, but it does suggest weakening emotional loyalty to the conservative establishment, particularly among younger and economically frustrated voters.
The broader implications extend well beyond local government races. The DP already controls the presidency and maintains........
