America’s Attack on Iran Should Have Asia-Pacific Countries Very, Very Worried

Having overthrown regimes in Latin America and the Middle East, why would Washington draw the line at Asia?

Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Delbert D. Black (DDG 119) fires a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) in support of Operation Epic Fury, Feb. 28, 2026.

The Trump administration’s worldviews and foreign policy have been framed as a break from the past. It’s true that several things distinguish Trump from his predecessors: his disdain for allies; lack of respect for global norms and institutions; and abjuring a value-driven foreign policy. But whether it be the neoconservatives of the George W. Bush administration, the liberal internationalists of the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations, or Trump’s transactional or value-neutral foreign policy, there has been more continuity than change in U.S. foreign policy from one presidency to the next. 

A common thread running through every post-Cold War U.S. presidency is the objective of maintaining primacy in the international system and a willingness to bend the rules to achieve this. From relying on “coalitions of the willing” during the second Iraq War to not ratifying the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or joining the International Criminal Court, the U.S.-led global order has maintained a “pleasant fiction” as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney referred to it in his speech at the Davos World Economic Forum in January. The strongest states (namely the United States) “exempt themselves when convenient,” and international law is “applied with varying rigor depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.” 

Trump’s behavior merely makes these actions more overt. There is no pretense of acting in accordance with international law and fewer constraints on his actions from U.S. Congressional oversight or securing a U.N. mandate.

Another common thread running through successive U.S. administrations is a proclivity for regime change. Putting aside the debate on the merits of removing unsavory regimes, the American urge to proselytize is well-entrenched. While every administration will criticize its predecessor for getting bogged down in humanitarian interventions and never-ending wars, they cannot resist getting themselves into the same situation. Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen U.S. military operations justified on the basis of upholding the rules-based international order (repelling the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait during the first Iraq War in 1990) or the liberal international order (humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and Somalia in the 1990s); acting in defense of U.S. national security interests (invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 following the 9/11 terrorist attacks); or for reasons of pure power politics (remaking the Middle East through the second Iraq War in 2003 under the false pretense of terrorism linkages and weapons of mass destruction claims). 

The reasons for U.S. military adventurism under Trump may be more difficult to define now (capturing President Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela and killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran, despite neither country posing an imminent or existential threat to the United States) but the proclivity to intervene remains unchanged. 

Contrast this with other emerging or global powers, such as China and India. While these countries do throw their weight around on occasion, particularly in their near-abroad, their impulse is to stay aloof rather than intervene. As a result, they are often criticized for being timid, not pulling their weight or being free riders of the international system. 

Beijing and New Delhi have done little to deter Washington’s recent military actions. China’s four global initiatives – covering development, security, civilization, and governance – ring hollow when it is unable to defend or stand up for key partners like Venezuela and Iran. And what does India’s ambition to be a so-called “voice” of the Global South mean when several countries in the Global South are under siege and New Delhi keeps silent? The recent sinking of an Iranian frigate by an American torpedo off the coast of Sri Lanka shortly after it participated in the MILAN multilateral naval exercise with India illustrates how New Delhi is largely toothless in the face of U.S. aggression in its neighborhood. This undermines the credibility of both countries’ ambitions to become net security providers in the Global South.

What does this mean for Asia? 

Asian countries may feel reassured by the United States having its hands full with the recurring instabilities in the Middle East and the ongoing war in Ukraine. Add to this the “Donroe Doctrine,” which regards the Western Hemisphere as the United States’ exclusive sphere of influence. These developments limit Washington’s bandwidth to intervene in Asia, in line with the struggle of successive U.S. administrations to complete a “pivot” toward Asia.

However, it would be a fallacy to believe that Asia is immune. During the Cold War, Asia was the focal point of the United States’ most prolonged military intervention, the Vietnam War. Why should one expect Washington to exercise restraint now? Having overthrown regimes in Latin America and the Middle East, why would Washington draw the line at Asia? 

Recent developments should be a wake-up call for Asia. Whether for the reasons of power or ideology, Washington will pounce on its long-time adversaries as soon as it perceives signs of weakness. The pace of technological change also makes war-fighting a lower risk activity, fueled by precision-strike operations and drone attacks that do not put Americans in harm’s way. 

Pyongyang may feel insulated by its nuclear weapons, but the Trump administration will feel emboldened by its recent “successes” in Venezuela and Iran. 

Even Beijing is not safe. While the probability of the U.S. decapitating the Chinese leadership may be near zero, it has arguably increased slightly given Trump’s appetite for taking risks, combined with the presence of several China hawks in his administration. From a U.S. perspective it also makes sense to move against Beijing sooner rather than later, as the balance of military power continues to shift in China’s favor over time. 

Nor are democratic regimes and U.S. alliance partners in Asia immune, as demonstrated by Trump’s threats against Greenland. 

Following the COVID-19 pandemic there was growing discussion of the need to de-risk from China given the world’s overwhelming supply-chain dependencies on the country. Now de-risking also refers to reducing exposure to the United States’ fickle, “might is right” foreign policy. Former Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio famously said that “today’s Ukraine may be tomorrow’s East Asia” in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. But this can now be rephrased as “today’s Middle East could be tomorrow’s Asia,” given Trump’s hubris and the United States’ never-ending mission to proselytize and preserve its primacy. 

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The Trump administration’s worldviews and foreign policy have been framed as a break from the past. It’s true that several things distinguish Trump from his predecessors: his disdain for allies; lack of respect for global norms and institutions; and abjuring a value-driven foreign policy. But whether it be the neoconservatives of the George W. Bush administration, the liberal internationalists of the Clinton, Obama, and Biden administrations, or Trump’s transactional or value-neutral foreign policy, there has been more continuity than change in U.S. foreign policy from one presidency to the next. 

A common thread running through every post-Cold War U.S. presidency is the objective of maintaining primacy in the international system and a willingness to bend the rules to achieve this. From relying on “coalitions of the willing” during the second Iraq War to not ratifying the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or joining the International Criminal Court, the U.S.-led global order has maintained a “pleasant fiction” as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney referred to it in his speech at the Davos World Economic Forum in January. The strongest states (namely the United States) “exempt themselves when convenient,” and international law is “applied with varying rigor depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.” 

Trump’s behavior merely makes these actions more overt. There is no pretense of acting in accordance with international law and fewer constraints on his actions from U.S. Congressional oversight or securing a U.N. mandate.

Another common thread running through successive U.S. administrations is a proclivity for regime change. Putting aside the debate on the merits of removing unsavory regimes, the American urge to proselytize is well-entrenched. While every administration will criticize its predecessor for getting bogged down in humanitarian interventions and never-ending wars, they cannot resist getting themselves into the same situation. Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen U.S. military operations justified on the basis of upholding the rules-based international order (repelling the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait during the first Iraq War in 1990) or the liberal international order (humanitarian interventions in the Balkans and Somalia in the 1990s); acting in defense of U.S. national security interests (invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 following the 9/11 terrorist attacks); or for reasons of pure power politics (remaking the Middle East through the second Iraq War in 2003 under the false pretense of terrorism linkages and weapons of mass destruction claims). 

The reasons for U.S. military adventurism under Trump may be more difficult to define now (capturing President Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela and killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran, despite neither country posing an imminent or existential threat to the United States) but the proclivity to intervene remains unchanged. 

Contrast this with other emerging or global powers, such as China and India. While these countries do throw their weight around on occasion, particularly in their near-abroad, their impulse is to stay aloof rather than intervene. As a result, they are often criticized for being timid, not pulling their weight or being free riders of the international system. 

Beijing and New Delhi have done little to deter Washington’s recent military actions. China’s four global initiatives – covering development, security, civilization, and governance – ring hollow when it is unable to defend or stand up for key partners like Venezuela and Iran. And what does India’s ambition to be a so-called “voice” of the Global South mean when several countries in the Global South are under siege and New Delhi keeps silent? The recent sinking of an Iranian frigate by an American torpedo off the coast of Sri Lanka shortly after it participated in the MILAN multilateral naval exercise with India illustrates how New Delhi is largely toothless in the face of U.S. aggression in its neighborhood. This undermines the credibility of both countries’ ambitions to become net security providers in the Global South.

What does this mean for Asia? 

Asian countries may feel reassured by the United States having its hands full with the recurring instabilities in the Middle East and the ongoing war in Ukraine. Add to this the “Donroe Doctrine,” which regards the Western Hemisphere as the United States’ exclusive sphere of influence. These developments limit Washington’s bandwidth to intervene in Asia, in line with the struggle of successive U.S. administrations to complete a “pivot” toward Asia.

However, it would be a fallacy to believe that Asia is immune. During the Cold War, Asia was the focal point of the United States’ most prolonged military intervention, the Vietnam War. Why should one expect Washington to exercise restraint now? Having overthrown regimes in Latin America and the Middle East, why would Washington draw the line at Asia? 

Recent developments should be a wake-up call for Asia. Whether for the reasons of power or ideology, Washington will pounce on its long-time adversaries as soon as it perceives signs of weakness. The pace of technological change also makes war-fighting a lower risk activity, fueled by precision-strike operations and drone attacks that do not put Americans in harm’s way. 

Pyongyang may feel insulated by its nuclear weapons, but the Trump administration will feel emboldened by its recent “successes” in Venezuela and Iran. 

Even Beijing is not safe. While the probability of the U.S. decapitating the Chinese leadership may be near zero, it has arguably increased slightly given Trump’s appetite for taking risks, combined with the presence of several China hawks in his administration. From a U.S. perspective it also makes sense to move against Beijing sooner rather than later, as the balance of military power continues to shift in China’s favor over time. 

Nor are democratic regimes and U.S. alliance partners in Asia immune, as demonstrated by Trump’s threats against Greenland. 

Following the COVID-19 pandemic there was growing discussion of the need to de-risk from China given the world’s overwhelming supply-chain dependencies on the country. Now de-risking also refers to reducing exposure to the United States’ fickle, “might is right” foreign policy. Former Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio famously said that “today’s Ukraine may be tomorrow’s East Asia” in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. But this can now be rephrased as “today’s Middle East could be tomorrow’s Asia,” given Trump’s hubris and the United States’ never-ending mission to proselytize and preserve its primacy. 

Chietigj Bajpaee is a senior research fellow for South Asia at Chatham House, a U.K.-based public policy think-tank.

Regime change in Iran

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