When Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi visited the White House in March, she reportedly told US President Donald Trump that Japan could not send forces to help secure the Strait of Hormuz due to limits under the country’s constitution.

Article 9 of Japan’s constitution renounces war and says the country will not maintain military forces for the purpose of settling international disputes. Since 1947, it has been the centrepiece of Japanese pacifism.

However, this could be changing. Takaichi’s conservative government has backed higher defence spending, looser arms-export restrictions, stronger regional security ties and, most controversially, a revision of Article 9.

Her government argues this is necessary to respond to rising threats from China and North Korea. Late last year, she enraged Beijing when she raised the spectre of coming to the defence of Taiwan. Earlier this month, Beijing accused her government of pursuing “reckless militarism”.

Public opinion in Japan remains divided over Takaichi’s more hard-line approach. Thousands have demonstrated in defence of the constitution, with many opposed to changes that might make it easier for Japan to join foreign wars.

But Japan’s pacifism has never simply been a static constitutional principle. For 80 years, it has been shaped by war memory, nuclear trauma, alliance politics, regional tensions and fierce political struggles over the meaning of peace.

The postwar view of peace

Around three million Japanese people died in the second world war, along with many millions across Japan’s Asia-Pacific empire. Several forces shaped what peace meant at this moment.

Early postwar thinkers connected peace to atonement. They spearheaded a “community of contrition” committed to addressing the social and individual shortcomings behind the country’s militarism. Shortly after Japan’s defeat, Prime Minister Naruhiko Higashikuni called for the “repentance of the entire nation”.

But postwar pacifism also drew heavily on a sense of victimhood. Many Japanese suffered through the firebombings of their cities and the deaths of loved ones on distant battlefields. Many felt their leaders had deceived them into fighting an unwinnable war.

The US-led occupation from 1945 to 1952 reinforced this sense of victimisation. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal tried 28 Japanese leaders for war crimes. Although the tribunal was criticised as “victors’ justice,” it confirmed for many Japanese that their leaders were to........

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