A key question remains over the landmark U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal announced with much fanfare on July 22, 2026: Will it allow a nation long suspected of having nuclear weapons ambitions to enrich uranium?

U.S. President Donald Trump has already shifted the sands of the agreement, adding a major caveat requiring Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel first. He also posted that there would be “no enrichment.”

But it is unclear whether either condition is included in the signed deal, something that has nonproliferation experts like me worried.

Allowing enrichment in any form would be a major step. Moreover, it would deviate from past experience. In 2009, the U.S. government signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates. Called a 123 agreement, it prohibited uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing – both of which can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons – and is seen as the gold standard of such deals.

The nonproliferation implications of the new Saudi-U.S. deal are clear. Without limits on the kingdom’s nuclear wish list, Riyadh might gain access to key capabilities relevant to producing the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons.

That could spark a nuclear arms race in the region, notably with Riyadh’s traditional rival for influence, Iran. In addition, the UAE has the right to renegotiate its 123 agreement with the U.S. should any other state in the region reach an agreement with Washington on more favorable terms.

Saudi’s nuclear ambitions

For years, senior Saudi officials have expressed interest in developing the full front end of the nuclear fuel cycle – meaning it would have the capability to undertake the key stages of the process, from mining to power generation.

The deal announced last week began with detailed discussions between Saudis and the U.S. during the Biden administration. Then, in........

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