On March 9, 2026, the Assembly of Experts—composed of Shiite clerics tasked under Iranian law with selecting the Supreme Leader (Vali-ye Faqih)—officially announced that Mojtaba Khamenei had been unanimously elected by those participating in the vote as the Third Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was reported in the media that only 59 out of the 88 members of the Assembly of Experts participated in the election, while the remaining members were not informed. Although the required two-thirds majority for the election was achieved, the manner and timing of the vote created the impression of a hasty and opaque process.

The selection of the Third Supreme Leader provided important indications regarding whether the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih would be upheld, whether the system itself would continue, and how the Islamic Republic of Iran would proceed.

In our article titled “Iranian Elections in Terms of Preparation for the Next Supreme Leader Selection,” published on March 19, 2024, the 12th parliamentary elections held on March 1, 2024, along with the elections for the 6th Assembly of Experts—responsible for selecting, supervising, and dismissing the Supreme Leader—were evaluated, and attention was drawn to the potential role of the Assembly of Experts in the selection of the Third Supreme Leader.[i]

In that article, it was predicted that one of two candidates would be selected, namely the then-President Ebrahim Raisi or Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Ali Khamenei. One of the prospective candidates, President Ebrahim Raisi, died in a suspicious helicopter crash on May 19, 2024—two months after the elections. At the time, some interpreted this incident as part of an internal power struggle aimed at eliminating one of the potential successors to the Supreme Leader.

As a result, Mojtaba Khamenei—despite being considered unlikely by many—continued as the strongest candidate, and the Assembly of Experts ultimately announced that he had been selected to replace his father, the Second Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the U.S.-Israeli attacks on February 28.

How Was the System of Selecting the Vali-ye Faqih Constructed?

It is highly probable that the identity of the Third Supreme Leader had been determined by the establishment prior to the March 1, 2024 elections. According to the Iranian Constitution, candidates wishing to run for the 88-member Assembly of Experts must first receive approval from the 12-member Guardian Council (Anayasa Koruyucular Konseyi, AKK). Of these 12 members, six clerics are appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, while the remaining six jurists are selected by the head of the judiciary—who is himself appointed by the Supreme Leader. Thus, the system was engineered in such a way that all pathways ultimately led back to Ali Khamenei through a complex mechanism of electoral design. The Guardian Council selected candidates for the March 1 elections from among those who would act in accordance with the directives of the establishment. Consequently, Ali Khamenei, through the Assembly of Experts formed by the Guardian Council, effectively determined his successor—his son Mojtaba Khamenei—indirectly, without issuing a formal designation.

In our 2024 article, we stated: “The identity of the third Supreme Leader will be determined by the preference of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which has gained sufficient power within the Assembly of Experts. Naturally, the IRGC will prefer a figure they can control—someone who will not undermine their existing power and influence within the system, who lacks an independent support base, and who will not challenge them.”

At that time, two potential candidates were mentioned: then-President Ebrahim Raisi and Mojtaba Khamenei. It was widely expected that Raisi’s rise—from being appointed as head of the judiciary by Ali Khamenei to becoming President—would culminate in his selection as Supreme Leader. However, Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash removed him from the race.

In the same article, we also pointed out that the power of the Third Supreme Leader would likely be limited and that the Velayat-e Faqih system would come under the control of the IRGC, which had become the dominant center of power:

“With the selection of the Third Supreme Leader, the position of Vali-ye Amr-e Mominin, which according to the Iranian Constitution represents the Prophet and the Twelve Infallible Imams, may in practice become accountable to the IRGC.”

Mojtaba Khamenei, who was selected as the Third Supreme Leader at the age of 56, is known to have maintained close ties with key security institutions—particularly the Office of the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—since the age of 17. These relationships have also played a significant role in facilitating communication between the leadership and the IRGC.

Since 2018, individuals employed in public institutions in Iran have been categorized as either “loyal to the Revolution” or “not loyal.” Those perceived as distant from the IRGC were purged on the grounds of disloyalty. During the tenure of Ali Khamenei, the IRGC consolidated its power by appointing its affiliates to key positions within the legislative, executive, and supervisory bodies, thereby becoming the true owner of the establishment.

Following the announcement of his leadership on March 9, 2026, it was also reported that Mojtaba Khamenei had been seriously injured in the same attack that killed his father. This further indicates that the establishment—now under the control of the IRGC—had pre-selected Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader to ensure continuity of the system.

In our previous analysis, we also predicted: “Ongoing economic difficulties due to sanctions, internal........

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