In the second of a two-part series, Peter Briggs examines the decommissioning, dismantling and waste-disposal risks Australia will inherit from AUKUS reactors.

The political narrative surrounding the AUKUS submarine project has heavily prioritised the immediate advantages of acquiring a “sealed, life-of-type” reactor. By eliminating the mid-life requirement for domestic refuelling infrastructure, the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) pathway has been presented as an elegant sovereign solution. The first part of this analysis detailed the early-stage industrial integration hurdles at Osborne and the risk of relying on an unproven, un-prototyped, sealed PWR3 reactor in the event of manufacturing or design shortcomings.

This article focuses on the most technically demanding and hazardous phase of nuclear stewardship: the final decommissioning, dismantling and disposal of the reactor cores and used fuel. When these submarines eventually reach the end of their operational service lives, Australia faces an unprecedented industrial hurdle to dispose of the reactor and its spent fuel. The technical divergence between Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) and weapons-grade HEU technologies during end-of-life handling reveals starkly contrasted risk profiles, infrastructure requirements and long-term security obligations.

The United Kingdom’s experience offers a blunt reminder that deferring these end-of-life liabilities can quickly paralyse a nuclear enterprise. To date, the Royal Navy has not completely dismantled a single decommissioned nuclear submarine, leaving a legacy backlog of 22 hulls stored afloat at Rosyth and Devonport while awaiting disposal. This systemic failure to address the backend of the lifecycle is detailed comprehensively in a 2019 UK National Audit Office Report.

Because the British experience reflects decades of industrial delays rather than an established, repeatable template, we must turn to United States and French practices to illustrate the true range of engineering paths, infrastructure demands and structural choices Australia will inevitably confront.

While the precise internal design arrangements for the future SSN-AUKUS platform remain under tight security parameters, the baseline industrial footprint of a sealed HEU propulsion system, as demonstrated by US management frameworks, imposes significant, predictable........

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