On Wednesday, June 17, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian digitally signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) intended to end the war between the United States and its allies on one side, and Iran and its allies on the other. 

The MoU came after more than two months of negotiations following the ceasefire that Washington announced on April 8 to allow for a negotiated settlement to the war that the U.S. and Israel had launched against Iran on February 28. Trump described the agreement as a “major win” for the United States and argued that it had prevented a “worldwide depression” by reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Vice President J. D. Vance said the 60-day negotiating period had begun, and pointed to the renewed passage of oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz as evidence that the agreement was already taking effect.

Yet this official presentation obscures more than it reveals. A closer reading of the MoU suggests that it is not a roadmap toward a final peace settlement with Iran, but an American exit strategy from a war that failed to improve Washington’s negotiating position. Far from forcing Iran to retreat from its pre-war positions, the conflict left Washington returning to negotiations under less favourable conditions than those that existed before the war began. Wars are ultimately judged not only by military operations but by the political settlements they produce. 

The Struggle over the MoU

The MoU was the product of a tense struggle over its terms from the moment the ceasefire was declared. Through Pakistani mediation, the U.S. put forward a 15-point plan to end the hostilities and move toward a permanent settlement. The plan proposed that the war could end if Iran accepted several U.S. conditions: no Iranian nuclear weapon, no domestic uranium enrichment, the transfer or removal of enriched uranium, expanded IAEA monitoring, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, limits on Iran’s missile program, and an end to Iranian support for its regional allies. In return, Washington would offer sanctions relief.

For its part, Iran responded with its own 10-point proposal. Tehran demanded a non-aggression guarantee, recognition of Iran’s role in the Strait of Hormuz, acceptance of enrichment on Iranian soil, the lifting of U.S. and international sanctions, an end to the war on all fronts including Lebanon, compensation for war damages, the release of frozen assets, and a binding UN Security Council resolution. Iran also insisted that its missile program was non-negotiable and that its regional allies were not concessions to be traded away.

The April 11–12 Islamabad talks between U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance and Iran’s parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, failed to produce an agreement. Washington responded by imposing a maritime blockade on traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports. Trump made clear that the blockade would remain in place until an agreement was finalized, saying it would “remain in full force and effect until an agreement is reached, certified, and signed.”

Yet the blockade failed to force Iran to yield. Instead, the dispute over the conditions for ending the war repeatedly pushed the ceasefire to the brink of collapse, with clashes in the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian attacks on U.S. interests in the Gulf, Israeli bombardment of southern Beirut, Iranian missile fire on Israel, and further U.S. retaliation. By June 10, Trump was still threatening additional strikes, while Pete Hegseth said U.S. forces would carry out nightly attacks on “key facilities” in Iran.

Then, abruptly, the tone changed. On June 11, Trump cancelled planned strikes against Iran, claiming that discussions had reached the highest levels of Iranian leadership and that........

© OpenCanada