Israeli–US–Iran War: The Trap of Asymmetric Conflict and the Geopolitical Failing of American Power

Trump walked into a trap set years in advance: a war he cannot win, on terms he does not control. What was meant to project strength is now reshaping the Middle East and accelerating a broader shift towards a fractured, post-hegemonic world order.

Trump Is Caught in Netanyahu’s Trap

What emerges from this trajectory is not merely a policy miscalculation but a structural trap: one long cultivated by Benjamin Netanyahu and rooted in the logic of asymmetric warfare.

At the core of this trap lies a fundamental mismatch between political ambition and military reality. Netanyahu’s long-standing objectives—regime change and weakening Iran—rest on a conventional understanding of military superiority. Trump, however, entered the conflict without a coherent strategic vision, effectively inheriting an escalation dynamic he neither designed nor controlled. As it was said, “the person without a plan… is Trump,” while Iran had anticipated precisely this scenario and prepared accordingly.

An Asymmetric Conflict

This is where the concept of asymmetric conflict becomes central. In international relations, asymmetric warfare refers to conflicts in which weaker actors avoid direct confrontation and instead exploit the vulnerabilities, such as economic, technological, and political, of stronger opponents.

Classic examples include U.S. engagements in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where initial military dominance gave way to prolonged attrition and strategic exhaustion. As former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis notes, the United States has repeatedly entered such conflicts with “immense confidence” only to exit “with its wings clipped.”

Iran has internalised these lessons. Lacking conventional superiority, it has deployed a doctrine aimed not at decisive victory but at protracted destabilisation. The so-called “mosaic defence strategy,” a decentralised system of command with multiple layers of succession, ensures operational continuity even under decapitation strikes. This is combined with the use of low-cost drones and older missile systems to exhaust the adversary’s high-value interceptors, effectively transforming the battlefield into a domain of “attrition economics”— death by a thousand cuts.

The implications are profound. The cost asymmetry is staggering: while Iran spends relatively little to sustain pressure, the U.S. and Israel incur enormous daily expenditures—estimated in the billions—to maintain defensive systems. This inversion of cost-efficiency is precisely the trap. It forces the stronger actor into a position where continuing the war becomes economically and politically unsustainable.

The withdrawal of the USS Abraham Lincoln symbolises this shift. Once considered the backbone of U.S. naval dominance, aircraft carriers are increasingly exposed in environments saturated with precision missiles and drone clouds. As several analysts suggest, this moment may mark a turning point in military doctrine, where “large and expensive targets” replace the notion of “impregnable fortresses.” Whether overstated or not, the symbolic damage to U.S. credibility is undeniable.

Yet the trap extends beyond the military domain. It is also geopolitical.

Trump now finds himself increasingly isolated. European allies — already alienated by unilateral decision-making and broader trade tensions — have shown little willingness to participate. The U.K., Poland, Germany, and Italy’s explicit refusal to join the war illustrates a broader trend: a growing reluctance within Europe to underwrite U.S.-led interventions, particularly when excluded from the decision-making process. The attempt to pressure NATO allies into securing the Strait of Hormuz only reinforces this perception of coercion and weakness.

The Gulf Monarchies Reassess Their Security Calculus

More significantly, the Gulf monarchies—long considered pillars of the U.S. regional order—are reassessing their security calculus. The war has exposed a paradox: the presence of U.S. bases may increase, rather than reduce, their vulnerability. These states were effectively asked to defend American assets on their own territory, while U.S. operations prioritised Israel’s security. This inversion undermines the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee and accelerates hedging strategies, including a diversification towards China.

The partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz further illustrates the global dimension of the conflict. Crucially, the disruption is selective: it targets U.S.-aligned economic flows while sparing those of alternative networks, particularly those not denominated in dollars. This introduces a structural challenge to the dollar-based global energy system and signals a broader shift towards fragmented economic blocs.

The Changing Geopolitical and War Dynamics

In this context, the future of neoliberal globalisation — particularly in the Gulf — is called into question. The region’s economic model has historically depended on stability, open trade routes, and U.S. security guarantees. The current conflict destabilises all three. If sustained, it may accelerate a transition towards more state-centric, security-driven economic arrangements, with significant implications for global markets.

Meanwhile, internal dynamics are shifting across all actors. In Iran, the war appears to have reinforced national cohesion and psychological resilience. The capacity to absorb initial shocks—including significant leadership losses—and to respond immediately has strengthened the perception of strategic preparedness and institutional continuity.

In Israel, by contrast, the tone of political and military discourse seems to be evolving: less marked by overconfidence and increasingly attentive to the limits of air power when confronted with a dispersed, adaptive adversary capable of inflicting substantial damage on critical infrastructure. In Washington, the prevailing mood is no longer one of anticipated military success but rather of crisis management and containment. The pressure of the coming midterm elections also plays a role.

This brings us back to the central question: what would constitute a “victory” for Trump?

In conventional terms, victory would imply regime change or decisive military degradation. Neither appears achievable. Instead, Trump’s objective seems to have shifted towards narrative management: seeking a symbolic success that allows for withdrawal. Yet even this is constrained by Iran’s position: Tehran insists that the war is not over and explicitly rejects American diplomacy, as they no longer believe in it, and has called upon its conditions to end the war.

Netanyahu’s Counterproductive Vision

The deeper issue, however, is structural. Netanyahu’s vision of regional hegemony—potentially through the fragmentation of Iran into a failed state— is strategically counterproductive. As experiences in Libya, Syria, and Iraq demonstrate, state collapse tends to generate prolonged instability, undermining not only regional order but also U.S. interests. In this sense, the trap is double-layered: a war that cannot be won and a victory that would be self-defeating.

Ultimately, this conflict reflects a broader transformation in global politics. The combination of asymmetric warfare, shifting alliances, and economic fragmentation points towards a post-hegemonic international order, in which traditional metrics of power are increasingly insufficient. Iran, despite its relative weakness, is shaping the rules of this new environment, demonstrating how resilience, adaptability, and strategic patience can offset material inferiority.

Trump did not simply enter a war with Iran. He entered a different kind of war, one that the United States has historically struggled to fight and even more to exit.

Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics

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