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Trump fell into Iran’s trap

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President Trump is not only failing to learn from history. He is also failing to learn from what is happening right now.

This was not a small tactical mistake. Trump walked into a war with no exit plan, then realised too late that Iran had set the battlefield for a war of exhaustion, not a quick victory. Washington is now stuck between two costly choices: it cannot pull back because that would look like failure, and it cannot go deeper because that risks a long war with no guaranteed results.

As the war moves into its third week, harder questions are rising inside Washington: what does “victory” even mean; and how can it be achieved while Iran still holds the strongest pressure point in this confrontation: the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait of Hormuz is Trump’s weak point

Trump’s biggest miscalculation was believing that firepower alone could force Iran to surrender before Iran turned Hormuz into a global pressure tool. Reality is different. Control of the strait is not an American decision. It is an Iranian one.

READ: US spent $12B since start of strikes on Iran, says White House economic adviser

And the worst part is that disruption does not require a large army in the traditional sense. One incident, one strike (by an Iranian soldier on a small boat, with an RPG on his shoulder), or even a rise in perceived risk can panic markets and push up oil prices, shipping insurance, and transport costs.

That puts Washington in a double trap:

If it declares “mission accomplished” and withdraws while Hormuz is still under threat, it will look like it lost the war economically. If it escalates to force the strait open, it enters a wider war with higher costs and no clear guarantees.

If it declares “mission accomplished” and withdraws while Hormuz is still under threat, it will look like it lost the war economically.

If it escalates to force the strait open, it enters a wider war with higher costs and no clear guarantees.

The Israeli promise that pulled Washington into trouble

A major part of the trap was set before the first strike. The war was built on an Israeli assumption: if Iran’s top leadership is hit, the state will collapse and the public will rise in the streets to bring down the system. This was sold to Trump as a shortcut: one decisive blow, rapid internal collapse, and political change without a long war.

That assumption failed. The system did not collapse, and the streets did not explode as expected. Iran reorganized leadership quickly and blocked any political vacuum that outsiders were counting on. This has also created tension inside the alliance. Washington wants to focus on Iran and Hormuz. Israel pushes to widen the war, including major escalation in Lebanon. That spreads military and political effort and raises the cost.

The Gulf wants a quick win, but the war is not in Trump’s hands

Some Gulf states want a fast end; on Washington and Tel Aviv’s terms; because they see that as the return of stability and manageable energy prices. That creates political pressure on Trump to intensify strikes. 

But more strikes do not solve the Hormuz problem. Firepower can destroy targets, but it cannot restore market confidence overnight, and it cannot stop Iran from keeping the strait under constant risk.

Worse still, a prolonged war may open other maritime fronts, such as Bab al-Mandab. That would mean the crisis moves from one chokepoint to another; from one shock to the next.

Conflicting goals: Open Hormuz or SOLVE the nuclear file?

Washington is now trying to achieve two competing goals:

Secure the Strait of Hormuz enough to calm markets. And, 

Deal with nuclear materials and enriched uranium stored in complex, fortified sites.

But talk of a “quick solution” to the nuclear issue points to dangerous scenarios: forces on the ground, technical operations, long timelines, and huge risks. This brings Washington back to the same problem: Trump entered expecting a short campaign, then found himself facing a war that demands costs he does not want to pay.

READ: Iran: We did not ask for negotiations or ceasefire

The real exhaustion: Weapons, defenses, and endless involvement

A war is not measured only by how many strikes are launched. It is measured by what is burned each day: air defences, expensive ammunition, and the political room to keep going.

As attacks continue, the key questions become: can Washington sustain this pace? Can its allies absorb the economic and security backlash?

Iran, meanwhile, is betting on time. It does not need to defeat the US militarily. It only needs to keep the war going long enough to turn it into a global burden: higher oil prices, higher inflation, weaker investment, and a political crisis inside Washington that cannot be covered by victory speeches.

Iran, meanwhile, is betting on time. It does not need to defeat the US militarily. It only needs to keep the war going long enough to turn it into a global burden: higher oil prices, higher inflation, weaker investment, and a political crisis inside Washington that cannot be covered by victory speeches.

Therefore, Trump entered a war with no exit

Trump fell into Iran’s trap because he bet on a quick collapse that never happened, and he tried to “close the file” by force without having the tools to close it. Now he faces a clear dilemma:

He cannot declare victory while Hormuz remains under pressure.

He cannot end the war without concessions, guarantees, or a settlement.

And every new escalation risks wider fronts and deeper economic damage.

This is not a war that will be decided by tough speeches. It will be decided by who can carry the cost longer. Iran, at least so far, is trying to make that cost global, not local, and to show that in this war, economics may be stronger than missiles in deciding when it ends.

OPINION: The war on Iran started with missiles, but oil price can end it

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.


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