Washington acts like it knows what it wants from Iran, but it is moving in the opposite direction: a war without a clear goal. There are many statements, loud threats, and talk of “total surrender,” but no realistic plan that answers basic questions: What is victory? How do you reach it? And how does this end?

The first gamble was simple and dangerous at the same time: if the head of the system is killed, or if Iran’s leadership is hit, the regime will collapse quickly and young people will flood the streets to bring it down. But that did not happen. What happened instead was more violence and more hardline rule. The gamble failed, and the result was the opposite: a tougher state, a harsher internal mood, and a society that closes ranks under pressure instead of falling apart.

That raises the real question: if the United States and its allies could not remove Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen after everything that happened there, how can they remove the regime of a large country like Iran?

That raises the real question: if the United States and its allies could not remove Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen after everything that happened there, how can they remove the regime of a large country like Iran?

Goals bigger than the tools

The problem is not American power by itself. The problem is the gap between goals and means. The administration talks about bringing down the regime, destroying the nuclear program, or ending Iran’s missile power; as if airstrikes can do that. This is not realistic.

Bringing down a state the size of Iran cannot be done from the sky. It would require a long ground war, occupation, and control of territory which lead to huge costs in lives and money. That is not something Trump can sell to the American public, or that Congress can easily support, or that Washington can afford while it is competing with China and Russia.

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So, the war moves in a vacuum: no ground invasion and no achievable end goal. What you get is a war of attrition and drain, not a war that ends things.

Confusion in Washington

There is a second problem: confusion inside the US decision-making.

The direction keeps changing. One day people hear about limited strikes, another day about wide escalation. One day about diplomacy, another day about “unconditional surrender.” This does not create strategy. It creates chaos.

The direction keeps changing. One day people hear about limited strikes, another day about wide escalation. One day about diplomacy, another day about “unconditional surrender.” This does not create strategy. It creates chaos.

The whole region can see it. Allies in the Gulf, Jordan, Turkey, and even Europe do not know where Washington is going. Is it pressure to improve a deal? Is it a plan to crush Iran? Or is it a show of force followed by a quick exit?

This kind of confusion increases the risk of mistakes. In wars, one incident can change everything.

Iran was not caught off guard

Iran does not look like a state that was shocked and then started reacting blindly. Signs suggest it entered this confrontation with a prepared plan for a large attack. That is why its response moved quickly into an organized pattern, not a messy reaction.

It also seems that the fight is being managed by the strongest institutions in the state, especially the Revolutionary Guard and bodies close to the top of the system. That explains why there is sometimes a gap between what the government discourse and what happens on the ground. In war, the security state takes the lead.

“The Wild Iran” and “The Rational Iran”

With escalation, Tehran tries to play two roles at once: pressure and deterrence on one side, and keeping a door open for talks on the other.

Iran wants to show it can go far. But it also wants to avoid turning this into a global political and economic war against it; especially on energy and shipping. That is why it avoids big official announcements like “we will close the Strait of Hormuz” even though the war itself can scare markets and disrupt shipping and insurance.

The war spills across the region

This is no longer only a US–Iran issue. It is turning into a regional confrontation. Iran’s allies in the region are getting involved, which reduces direct pressure on Iran, spreads the fronts, and raises the cost for everyone.

At the same time, Iran sends a clear message to regional states: “We do not want to strike you, but do not let your territory be used against us”. This is not only propaganda. It is a direct political and economic warning: any state that offers its ground for the war may end up under fire, while any state that blocks that route may open space for calm.

This is where the Gulf faces a painful reality. Its economy depends on one idea: stability. If the region becomes a daily drone-and-missile zone, the image of “a safe place to invest” will suffer, no matter how much money is available.

Energy is the heart of the crisis

The most dangerous part of this war is that it hits the core of the global economy: oil, gas, shipping, and key waterways. A long disruption will push prices up, fuel inflation, pressure supply chains, and create a wider global crisis.

The Gulf will feel it quickly. If storage fills up and exports slow down, countries may cut production. Restarting later is not always simple. That means financial losses, higher risk, and more market fear.

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Russia in the picture

There is also growing talk about a Russian role; through information sharing or technical help that improves Iran’s ability to target sensitive assets. Whether this role is small or large, the meaning is clear: this war will not stay local. It becomes part of a bigger power struggle.

Russia, like China, loses little if Washington burns through expensive weapons and stockpiles in the Middle East. They may gain, because they see their rival drained far from the main arenas.

In exhaustion wars, the question is not only “who wins today” but “who lasts longer” and “who pays the price”.

Washington may win some strikes, but it will pay a heavy political and economic cost if the war drags on. Gulf states may suffer even if they are not direct fighters, because war shakes markets, investment, shipping, and energy. Others may benefit from the chaos like Israel, which wants a weaker region, or major powers that want to drain the U.S.

But the biggest loser will be the region itself.

So, this war looks losing because its goals are bigger than its tools. You cannot topple a regime from the air. You cannot bomb away nuclear know-how. You cannot permanently end missile power that can be rebuilt. And it is dangerous because an open-ended war threatens regional stability and the global economy, and turns the Gulf into a constant risk zone instead of a space of investment and safety.

In a war like this, Washington might win rounds in the air; but it risks losing the bigger picture on the ground: a more unstable Middle East, a less secure Gulf, and a world paying the price for a conflict that no one knows how to end.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

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