Persian proverb goes, ‘A river cuts through rock not because of its power, but because of its persistence.’ True to that maxim, Iran has demonstrated its stubborn capacity to endure weathering sanctions and military pressure while boldly refusing to bend to external coercion. The assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in US–Israeli strikes on 28 February has hardened Iran’s narrative of resistance. Tehran now frames the war as an existential struggle for the survival of the Islamic Republic. The escalation underscores Iran’s resilience within its political system, the persistence of its domestic support and the strategic logic of survival through asymmetric warfare, while the escalation simultaneously exposes a troubling disarray in Washington’s strategic objectives.

A favourite tactic of war is to decapitate the enemy leadership. While such strategies might work in certain contexts, such as Iraq or Syria, where taking the head of the regime made the whole system collapse, Iran is structured for longevity. The death of Ali Khamenei, along with many senior officials, has exposed the US’s misjudgement that their end would bring an end to the ‘Axis of Resistance.’  It was only a week later that, contrary to US hopes of playing a role in choosing Iran’s next leader, Tehran elected Mojtaba as the successor.

Against American and Israeli assessments, the episode reveals that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s stronghold is not built on one Supreme Leader. It is the regime’s deeply entrenched political system and institutions that fortify the roots of Iran’s persistence. At the forefront is the well-funded and heavily armed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an ideologically driven force with well-established mechanisms ensuring continuity and stability. Likewise,

Iran does not rely on a single military chain of command. It has a complex, multi-layered military structure to absorb shocks.

Iran does not rely on a single military chain of command. It has a complex, multi-layered military structure to absorb shocks.

There are many regime enforcers and defenders to ensure its survival, led by the IRGC and its subordinate paramilitary Basij group, across the country to suppress any domestic uprisings and fight for the endurance of the regime. 

Moreover, the recent strikes appear to have been counterproductive, strengthening nationalist sentiment within Iran rather than weakening the regime.

Moreover, the recent strikes appear to have been counterproductive, strengthening nationalist sentiment within Iran rather than weakening the regime.

The resentment among Iranian against the regime may now instead motivate them to rally around the state and resist foreign intervention, particularly after strikes targeted civilians. Iranians have felt betrayed by the US since its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Similarly, statements by the Oman interlocutors during talks in Muscat and Geneva hinted at major concessions on the nuclear issue that Iran under Khamenei was ready to make. This could be traced back to a religious decree issued in the early 2000s that Khamenei had banned the development of nuclear weapons. Thus, in the current scenario, the next leader would be unlikely to have the political space to follow suit, followed by announcements to intensify attacks and avenge the deaths of their senior leadership.

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Another Persian proverb warns, ‘He who chases two hares catches none.’ Within this context, the current American strategy mirrors a strategy of disarray, with the ultimate means, ends, and goals unclear to itself. Following the February strike, President Trump vowed that the combat would continue until all objectives were achieved. However, the stated justifications for the war have whipsawed among preventing Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, taking out the ballistic missiles, deposing the Iranian regime that brutally represses dissent, and stopping an imminent attack from Iran on US interests. However, Trump has provided scant evidence to prove that Iran posed an immediate threat. Likewise, the rationale of deterring Iran from achieving its nuclear objectives contradicts Washington’s own claims during the 12-day war that the June airstrikes had already ‘obliterated’ Iran’s nuclear programme, capabilities, and ambitions. The muddled messaging underscores Washington’s strategic incoherence, revealing a campaign in which the objectives remain as unsettled as the conflict itself. 

In contrast, Iran’s high-risk ‘mosaic defence’ strategy, which relies on asymmetric endurance, has proven resilient. Tehran, unable to match US conventional power, has employed proxies, underground and dispersed ‘missile cities,’ a vast and diverse missile arsenal aimed at targeting US bases, ports, and energy infrastructure across the Gulf. The escalation has also pushed oil prices upwards amid tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. This ‘multiplication of exposure’ reflects Tehran’s bold strategy of unilaterally globalising the costs of conflict. In doing so, it aims to force Washington toward a diplomatic resolution or deepen divisions among US allies, largely succeeding in both. Therefore, faced with mounting risks, Trump has increasingly resorted to face-saving rhetoric, claiming that Iran was seeking surrender, apologising, or asking for a ceasefire.

Conclusively, Tehran’s posture increasingly resembles that of an embattled state that sees greater odds of survival in confrontation than in compromise, one that views a decisive clash not as a catastrophe, but as a potential turning point. 

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