The statement issued by the office of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, announcing the summoning of the US chargé d’affaires and handing him a “strongly worded” protest note, as reported by Reuters, appears in the balance of realpolitik closer to a performance of sovereignty in a country that does not possess the actual tools of sovereignty. A state that cannot control armed factions within its own borders, nor prevent drones launched from its territory, inevitably finds itself in an extremely fragile position when it tries to address a superpower in the language of protest.

The talk of a “firm and solid stance in preserving sovereignty” seems detached from a reality documented daily in the Western press: sovereignty fragmented between Washington, Tehran, and the factions; and a state trying to look like a state while its security decision-making slips through its fingers.

Iran-backed factions launch near-daily attacks on US interests inside Iraq, without the government being able to deter them, as documented by reports from the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), which describe Iraq as “caught in the crossfire” between two forces trading blows on its soil, while the government is “losing control of the trajectory of events” as the mutual attacks on its territory continue.

At the same time, the militias operating under the umbrella of the al-Hashd al-Shaabi function as a parallel power: they benefit from official cover while moving according to an Iranian agenda, and they impose the limits of the state’s capacity before any external power does.

At the same time, the militias operating under the umbrella of the al-Hashd al-Shaabi function as a parallel power: they benefit from official cover while moving according to an Iranian agenda, and they impose the limits of the state’s capacity before any external power does.

In this landscape, Iraq becomes a trapped and lost state, while al-Sudani speaks of “sovereignty” in a manner that deserves political pity. International media describe Iraq as a “two-way battlefield,” where Baghdad desperately tries to balance between two forces it cannot afford to anger. Iran expands the theater of war through its proxies, and the United States responds with precision strikes, while the Iraqi government has nothing but the language of statements.

Iraq is being struck by both sides, and there is a third, wilayi (pro-Iran) actor inside Iraq that is also bombing Iraq itself—and that is the source of the political comedy. It is the only state in this conflict that receives crossfire from all directions, which makes any talk of “keeping Iraq out of the war” closer to political wishful thinking than to actual capacity.

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At the heart of this paradox lies the most embarrassing question: how can a government that cannot summon or hold accountable the leaders of the militias summon the US chargé d’affaires and brandish a protest note? Washington is an external power that can be addressed diplomatically. The factions, however, are an internal armed force, deeply embedded in state institutions, with political, economic, and military influence that far exceeds the government’s ability to control them. Protesting against Washington is easy, because it is politically safe. Protesting against the factions is impossible, because it is existentially costly.

The language of the statement—“firm and solid stance,” “preserving sovereignty,” “heinous crime,” “irresponsible actions”—does not change the fact that sovereignty is violated from within before it is violated from without, that security decision-making is fragmented among multiple actors, and that the government is more concerned with preserving the image of the state than with exercising actual authority. It is a language used to fill the gap between what the state ought to be and what it actually is.

Before al-Sudani pledged to punish a “cowardly group”—without naming it—behind the deadly attack on the headquarters of the intelligence service in Baghdad and the killing of one of its officers, he declared that the government would not stand idle in the face of violations against state institutions. But no one, including those closest to al-Sudani himself, truly believes this pledge.

The militia that bombed the intelligence building in the al-Mansour district used a state-owned facility while successfully carrying out its operation. If al-Sudani is unable even to name this militia, how can he possibly punish it?

The militia that bombed the intelligence building in the al-Mansour district used a state-owned facility while successfully carrying out its operation. If al-Sudani is unable even to name this militia, how can he possibly punish it?

The conclusion is that the Iraqi protest against the United States resembles raising one’s voice in a room where no one is listening, while the real sounds—the whine of drones and the roar of rockets—are launched from inside Iraq itself, without the government having the ability to silence them.

The statement is a political attempt to register a position, but it does not change the reality that Iraq today is not the sole decision-maker on its own soil, and that the “sovereignty” al-Sudani speaks of is closer to a theoretical concept than to an actual condition.

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