The shift in American priorities regarding Libya was laid bare on 18th February 2026, during the UN Security Council’s 60-day briefing. Libya observers including myself, expected the usual diplomatic platitudes from the US State Department, the microphone was instead taken by Massad Boulos.

As the Senior Advisor to President Trump for Arab and African Affairs, Boulos’s appearance was a stark departure from protocol. He is not a career diplomat from “Foggy Bottom,” but a direct extension of the West Wing. By having Boulos deliver the US comments following the briefing—rather than the U.S. Permanent Representative—the Trump administration signalled that the “Libya File” has been officially annexed by the White House.

This is more than a mere change of face; it represents a potential fundamental shift in both doctrine and priority. Boulos utilised his time at the horseshoe table to center ‘military and economic integration’ and ‘commercial priorities’—a sharp pivot away from the State Department’s long-standing, and largely failed, fixation on a purely political roadmap and immediate elections.

For the first time in years, Washington is no longer treating Libya as a democratic experiment to be facilitated by Foggy Bottom, but as a strategic asset to be managed directly from the President’s inner circle.

For the first time in years, Washington is no longer treating Libya as a democratic experiment to be facilitated by Foggy Bottom, but as a strategic asset to be managed directly from the President’s inner circle.

Notably, Boulos offered a brief, almost perfunctory nod to his country’s support for the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). However, the substance of his subsequent remarks stood in stark contrast to the mission’s established roadmap. What Boulos presented was effectively a new, unilateral American initiative—one designed to ‘fix’ Libya by absorbing the UN’s stagnant efforts into a more pragmatic, results-oriented framework. It was a clear acknowledgement that while the UN’s work remains the official backdrop, Washington no longer views that work as a viable path to success.

Recent reports confirm that Boulos has been operating a shadow diplomatic track that frequently bypasses the UN’s public roadmaps. Beyond the formal halls of the UNSC, Boulos has reportedly convened high-level representatives from both the Haftar camp (Saddam Haftar) and the Government of National Unity (Ibrahim Dbeibah) in Paris as recently as late January and early February 2026. These meetings, which build on the clandestine ‘Rome Channel’ established last year, suggest a deliberate push for a new unified government—not one born of the ballot box, but a pragmatic ‘Frankenstein’ administration composed of the present de facto powers in Benghazi and Tripoli. By facilitating these direct encounters in European capitals, the White House is attempting to manufacture a top-down stability that ensures American commercial and energy interests remain undisturbed by the unpredictability of a true democratic transition.

READ: Epstein email reveals plan to pursue frozen Libyan assets with help from former MI6, Mossad figures

This trajectory diverges sharply from UNSMIL’s long-awaited roadmap, which is centered on a short-term unified government tasked with the singular objective of organizing national elections within a maximum of one year. In contrast, Boulos is reportedly aiming for an extended transitional period of at least three years—a ‘stabilization phase’ that prioritizes institutional and economic integration over immediate suffrage. Under this West Wing vision, elections are not the starting point for stability, but a distant milestone that may only be reached once the present power-sharing arrangement is fully cemented.

The clearest evidence of this West Wing takeover lies in the shift from diplomatic rhetoric to tangible, ‘ground-truth’ agreements. Just last week, on 27th March 2026, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) signed a landmark memorandum with Chevron to explore offshore Block NC146—a move that signals a return of American energy majors to underexplored Libyan waters under the protection of this new ‘stabilization phase.’ Simultaneously, the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is moving forward with Flintlock 26. Scheduled to commence later month, this premier special operations exercise will, for the first time, include a joint training hub in Sirte, where security forces from both Tripoli and Benghazi are expected to train together. By prioritising these high-stakes energy contracts and military manoeuvres, Washington is effectively bypassing the ‘fog’ of UN-led political negotiations.

The message is unmistakable: the White House is not looking for a Libyan ‘spring’ of democratic renewal; it is building a Libyan ‘fortress’ of energy security and counter-terrorism, managed directly by the West Wing to ensure American interests remain insulated from the country’s chronic political fragmentation. 

The message is unmistakable: the White House is not looking for a Libyan ‘spring’ of democratic renewal; it is building a Libyan ‘fortress’ of energy security and counter-terrorism, managed directly by the West Wing to ensure American interests remain insulated from the country’s chronic political fragmentation. 

Ultimately, the West Wing’s ‘annexation’ of the Libya file is driven by a cold geopolitical calculation: the containment of Russia. By fostering a direct, transactional relationship between Tripoli and Benghazi, the Trump administration is attempting to create a unified security and economic structure that effectively crowds out Moscow’s influence. The rebranding of the Wagner Group into the state-controlled Africa Corps has only raised the stakes for Washington. By bringing both rival factions into the Flintlock 26 exercises and securing massive energy contracts like the Chevron deal, the White House is offering the Libyan elite a ‘Western Alternative’ that promises international legitimacy and capital in exchange for distancing themselves from the Kremlin. It is a high-stakes gamble that treats Libya not as a nation in need of a soul, but as a chessboard where the West Wing is determined to make the final move. Whether this ‘Boulos Doctrine’ leads to a lasting peace or merely a more efficient form of division remains to be seen, but one thing is certain: the era of the State Department’s patient diplomacy is over, replaced by a West Wing realism that values a signed contract over a cast ballot.

Ultimately, Massad Boulos has proven himself to be a faithful mirror of his superior’s worldview: 100 percent transactional and largely indifferent to the ‘fog’ of democratic values. Yet, despite the high-profile meetings in Paris and the headline-grabbing energy deals, there is little evidence to suggest that this West Wing takeover will yield actual success for Libya—or the wider African continent. By annexing the Libyan file, Boulos risks repeating the mistakes of the past: prioritizing elite-level ‘management’ over the genuine aspirations of a population that has been promised elections for years, only to be repeatedly let down. For a Libyan public eager for structural change, the ‘Boulos Doctrine’ offers no real benefits; it merely swaps the slow stagnation of Foggy Bottom for a more efficient form of ‘managed decay.’ In the end, Boulos may find that while it is easy to sign a contract in a European capital, it is far more difficult to govern a nation that has been systematically denied its voice in favour of failed elites’ deals with little concern for people’s wishes.

OPINION: When presidents lie, diplomacy dies: The global cost of post-truth under Trump

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

© Middle East Monitor