The Gulf has spent decades buying security from the world’s most powerful military. American bases dot the region, advanced weapons fill its arsenals, and defence agreements bind its rulers to Washington. Yet the war involving Iran has exposed a troubling paradox. The Gulf’s security arrangements may help deter adversaries, but they cannot guarantee that the region will escape a conflict shaped by decisions made elsewhere.

The consequences are no longer confined to military installations or oil terminals. Disruption around the Strait of Hormuz threatens energy exports and maritime commerce, while attacks on critical infrastructure jeopardise the economic transformation programmes on which Gulf governments have staked their futures. Wealth can finance reconstruction, but it cannot restore lost confidence overnight.

The problem is not that the United States has become irrelevant. Its intelligence, airpower, naval capabilities and logistical reach remain difficult to replace. Nor does greater independence mean that Iran’s regional ambitions should be ignored. Rather, the Gulf faces a structural dilemma: the states most exposed to escalation do not necessarily possess the greatest influence over the decisions that produce it.

That dilemma demands a different ambition.

The Gulf does not need a security order without Washington. It needs one that can survive Washington’s changing priorities. The objective should be to turn external protection into one pillar of regional security, rather than the foundation on which everything else depends.

The Gulf does not need a security order without Washington. It needs one that can survive Washington’s changing priorities. The objective should be to turn external protection into one pillar of regional security, rather than the foundation on which everything else depends.

The limits of an American security umbrella

For decades, American military power has underwritten the security of the Gulf monarchies. The US Fifth Fleet operates from Bahrain, while Qatar hosts Al Udeid Air Base, a major centre for American air operations. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have invested heavily in American aircraft, missile defence and other advanced systems. These arrangements provide capabilities that would be costly and difficult to reproduce independently.

But military protection is not the same as strategic control. Washington ultimately decides how to deploy its forces, which threats deserve priority and when military action serves American interests. Gulf governments can influence these calculations through diplomacy and cooperation, but they cannot assume that their preferences........

© Middle East Monitor