The Coalition of the Willing, made up of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, at their Summit in Paris on 13 July 2026, in a joint declaration established an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Coalition for Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) of Europe. They committed to build this capability under a shared architecture that complements and builds on existing national and broader ABM solutions.[1]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s statements limit the coalition goals to accelerated support for the Freyja ABM project, comprising a homegrown Ukrainian interceptor supported by German radars and Norwegian Command and Control (C2) systems among its primary components. These two overlapping narratives indicate that Freyja would be the first operational deliverable of a broader effort for a futuristic ABM capability exclusive to Europe.[2] The establishment of the Bliksem EXO Consortium on 14 July 2026, an industrial collaboration for future exo-atmospheric interceptors, also reinforces this likely trajectory.[3]

The key imperative for the ABM coalition remains Russia’s Ballistic Missile (BM) campaign in Ukraine. President Zelensky’s request at Paris for 300 Patriot missiles to tackle the envisaged 2026 Russian winter offensive points to a capacity and capability (technology) gap in its arsenal of Air Defence (AD)/BMD systems.[4] Ukraine counters the variety of missiles launched at its territory with an inventory which is mostly US/Europe loaned.

These include American MIM-104 Patriot (six batteries),[5] the joint Franco-Italian SAMP/T AD System, IRIS-T SLM (Germany), and some units of the Kongsberg-Raytheon National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS).[6] Amongst these, the Patriot and SAMP/T are designed to counter BMs and are reportedly deployed for high-value asset defence. While it is difficult to assess the efficacy of BMD systems in general, given the complexities involved, datasets of interceptions in Patriot-defended areas reveal a decline in interception rates of Iskander-M missiles since around 2024.[7]

The scarcity of interceptors compounds the problem. On 2 July 2026, the Ukrainian Air Force reported countering a higher number of BMs (74 missiles) fired at them in an overnight offensive, with low interception rates.[8] A similar pattern was reported in the period 12–15 May 2026.[9] Analysts ascribe the degraded performance of Ukrainian air defences to a surge in Russian offensive amid shortfalls of Patriot interceptors given the protracted US–Iran conflict.[10] The Ukrainian President’s hopes of Freyja’s operationalisation in the next 12 months come against this backdrop, enabling cheaper domestically produced interceptors that can be developed at scale.[11]

The secondary drivers for the coalition can also be understood when contextualised to the unique situation of a combined or collective approach to AD, typical of Europe and NATO-allied partners.[12] Despite complexities in concept and implementation, the guiding adage for any AD or Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) architecture is rather basic: threat perception and threat assessment. This presents a dichotomy in the case of Europe. Unlike sovereign States that calibrate their defences based on individual threat perceptions, all signatories of the declaration (except Ukraine) are NATO members who primarily depend on the alliance IAMD framework to address threats to their skies and protect their expeditionary forces on foreign soils. This........

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