The US–Israel war on Iran has accelerated the reconfiguration of West Asia’s geopolitical and connectivity landscape, heightening the importance of alternative land-based transport corridors. Türkiye has positioned itself as a critical logistics and energy hub linking Asia, the Gulf and Europe. These developments challenge some strategic assumptions underpinning the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and create possibilities for new regional alignments.

Since the emergence of world markets in the modern era, regional and transcontinental infrastructure corridors have served as tools of economic statecraft, especially by great powers. During a period of accelerating globalisation in the post-Cold War era, infrastructure, economic and energy corridors were primarily driven by the market logic of efficiency. Uninterrupted, streamlined flows, especially with container shipments, helped reduce logistics costs between production centres and consumer markets and, over time, redistributed production chains from West to East and from North to South.

Over the last decade, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has a declared aim of establishing new international transport corridors purportedly aligned with the national development strategies of other states, has introduced a new dynamic of competitive corridors in Eurasia. In West Asia, key Gulf States, Israel, Iran and Türkiye have sought to leverage their geographic location, economic and financial resources, and diversified foreign policies to enhance their role in the Eurasian connectivity landscape. These connectivity dynamics are being shaped by strategic competition between global and regional powers and by their objectives to diversify and de-risk supply chains and transport routes.

The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), unveiled in 2023, envisaged a new vision for Europe–Asia connectivity that sought to advance Israel’s integration with its Arab neighbours. At the same time, it proposed circumventing maritime ‘chokepoints’ at the Suez Canal, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz by creating new land routes through the Arabian Peninsula. Israel’s war in Gaza following Hamas’s attack in October 2023, which entangled the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, precipitated a regime change in Syria and eventually led to two wars with Iran. These conflicts have upended the regional balance of power and perceptions of threat, thereby reshaping the strategic priorities driving connectivity projects.

Most Gulf States are alarmed by Israel’s hegemonic doctrine of achieving security through regional dominance and will therefore be willing to seek alternatives to the IMEC, especially if it entails structural dependence on Israel for access to the Mediterranean.[1] Iran’s disruption of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and its bid to formalise its leverage over the strait by changing its legal status of ‘international transit’ underscore the perils of dependence on a single export route and the importance of developing land-based transport corridors in West Asia.

The war has also given rise to a new regional configuration comprising Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Türkiye and Egypt, with shared objectives of reducing the risk of miscalculation and supporting de-escalation. It could emerge as a more durable partnership to coordinate on post-war security and geopolitics. Türkiye, which was bypassed in IMEC, is likely to consolidate its position as a regional logistics and energy hub between Asia and Europe. The war in Iran has led Ankara to inject new momentum into its flagship projects, the ‘Middle Corridor’ and ‘Development Road’. Most importantly, the revival of the historic Hejaz Railway with Saudi Arabia will strengthen Türkiye’s regional position in Gulf–Europe connectivity while countering the rival vision of the IMEC, which was predicated on integrating Israel into its Arab environment.

Growing Importance of the Middle Corridor

Amid unprecedented disruptions in the maritime trade, Türkiye’s corridor politics has gained prominence, with Ankara mobilising concerted diplomacy to advance new transport lines as instruments of resilience and stability, while strengthening its own regional positioning. Türkiye’s broader approach is to turn geography into a transit power by linking Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Levant and the Gulf through a mix of rail, road, energy and port infrastructure. The core of this strategy is the multimodal Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or ‘Middle Corridor’, which is being promoted as a reliable long-term alternative to the Northern Corridor via Russia. Its overland segment extends from China through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; a trans-Caspian leg connects the Aktau/Kuryk and Turkmenbashi ports with Baku/Alat in Azerbaijan; and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway links the Caspian Sea transport network with Türkiye and Europe.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Union’s Global Gateway connectivity initiative has prioritised strengthening cross-regional connectivity between the EU and Central........

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