Ever since Pakistan took the initiative to facilitate the United States and Iran in reaching an understanding to end the West Asia crisis, the hybrid regime at home swung into action to create a new narrative around its so-called regional diplomatic success. The situation on the ground, however, is entirely different from what Pakistan wants to portray to the world. The internal security situation has deteriorated, whereas economic growth lacks momentum. There is a complete disgruntlement in the society over governance. To divert people’s attention from real issues, the security establishment has pushed for the creation of new administrative units at a time when none of the political parties is prepared for it.

The army has historically been an important stakeholder and, in many instances, a prime mover in the Pakistani political system. It not only managed the affairs of the state directly by imposing martial law and suspending/abrogating the constitution; it also influenced major policy decisions even during periods when the so-called civilian set-up was at the helm in Islamabad. History suggests that military dictators in Pakistan suffer from a dual yet perennial crisis of legitimacy and credibility during their direct rule and become highly unpopular after some time, leading to their exit. Similarly, a Chief of Army Staff (COAS) with an unusually long stint in office faces a similar set of challenges.

For its survival, the present PML-N-led and PPP-supported political set-up is completely dependent on Asim Munir, who currently holds the dual offices of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) and COAS. The Shehbaz Sharif-led civilian set-up appears to be crawling before Asim Munir. In a completely changed geopolitical environment, especially due to the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, Pakistan has emerged as a vital third party facilitating a negotiated settlement between the United States and Iran.

Given its geo-strategic location and rentier character, Pakistan often presents itself as a useful partner to the powerful states in the international system. However, in all such endeavours, the security establishment emerges as the real beneficiary. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq strengthened his position during the Afghan Jihad, whereas Gen. Pervez Musharraf tightened his grip during the US’ War on Terror in the region.

Undermining Democratic Institutions

Asim Munir has been utilising the opportunity offered by the geo-political changes introduced by the Middle East crisis to undermine the civilian dispensation on the one hand and strengthen his position on the other. Ever since he made it to the good books of President Donald Trump, who refers to him as his favourite Field Marshal, Munir’s fortunes at home received a tremendous boost. He used the newfound confidence to introduce fundamental changes to the system, which have somewhat undermined the country’s democratic and constitutional institutions.

It is important to note that he was instrumental in ensuring the smooth sailing of the 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments in the National Assembly and the Senate. The 26th Constitutional Amendment allowed a parliamentary committee to appoint the Chief Justice of Pakistan, overlooking the seniority principle.[1] This was followed by new legislation to ensure a favourable balance in the higher judiciary by increasing the number of judges in the Supreme Court from 17 to 34 and in the Islamabad High Court from 9 to 12.[2] It also increased the tenures of all armed services chiefs from three to five years.[3] It was akin to giving Asim Munir an extension before his original tenure was set to end.

Soon after the Pahalgham terror attack, Operation Sindoor, launched by India to punish the perpetrators of proxy war and eliminate terror nurseries nurtured by Pakistan,[4] prompted Pakistan to launch Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos.[5] During the four-day military action, India demonstrated its ability to strike deep inside Pakistan with complete precision by targeting several terror camps in Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK) as well as in Punjab province, which included inter alia Sawai Nala Camp and Syedna Bilal Camp in Muzaffarabad, Gulpur and Abbas Camps in Kotli, Barnala Camp in Bhimber, Markaz Taiba Camp in Muridke, Markaz Subhanallah Camp in Bahawalpur, Sarjal and Mahmoona Joya Camps in Sialkot.[6] India also targeted 11 airfields in the Punjab and Sindh provinces of Pakistan, including Nur Khan/Chaklala (Rawalpindi), Rafiqui (Shorkot), Murid, Rahim Yar Khan, Chunian, Sargodha, Pasrur and Sialkot, Sukkur, Bholari and Jacobabad.[7]

Despite the stunning success of Indian armed forces during the four-day military action, Pakistan made unsuccessful attempts to build a narrative as if it had achieved some victory. To lend its peddled narrative some credence, on 20 May 2026, the Pakistani cabinet........

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