Operation Epic Fury began on February 28, 2026 at 1:15 AM Eastern Time. Initial targets included IRGC command and control centers, air defense systems, missile and drone sites, as well as naval installations. Iranian leadership was decapitated; Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in his compound in Tehran. One day later, on March 1, President Trump announced that the campaign had been planned as an operation to last for four to five weeks, promising that it would not be difficult. 

As of this writing, six months later, the conflict continues. What light does this shed on Epic Fury and what lessons can be drawn?

In terms of its stated goals, the joint American-Israeli operations during March were successful. Iran’s military capacity was profoundly degraded. Yet no matter how rational the planning and effective the delivery, Clausewitz teaches that entering war elicits degrees of unpredictability, the so-called “fog of war,” where unforeseen factors come into play. It is never just a matter of the well-laid plans and clear intentions; as the saying goes, “the enemy gets a vote.” In addition, the goal of war is not simply defeating the adversary’s military forces; it is about imposing one’s will on the enemy, in other words, translating battlefield success into political outcomes. The outcome of Epic Fury still remains elusive. Rapid military success has been followed by inconclusive negotiations. 

In the frustrating months since the initial attacks, with both sides engaging in triumphalist rhetoric designed for domestic consumption and the focus shifting to the Straits of Hormuz, the Trump administration has respected two redlines, at least so far. First and foremost, there has been no deployment of ground troops. Press reports of plans to seize Kharg Island were in fact confirmed by a posting by the President on June 11, although it is not clear as to whether he was describing a contingency plan soon to be launched or only engaging in the on-going war of words with Tehran. Boots-on-the-ground is dangerous political territory insofar as it would open the administration to the accusation of initiating another “endless war.” Deciding against ground troops however poses the question as to whether air power alone can produce victory.

Secondly, the administration has apparently decided against pursuing an irredentist strategy of supporting a Kurdish uprising within Iran. Iran is a multi-ethnic state in which Persians make up at most 60% of the population. A Kurdish rebellion in the northwestern part of the country might contribute to a........

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