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Russia’s Sahel Intervention Is Riskier Than It Looks

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tuesday

For several hours last month, the fate of the Nigerien junta hung by a thread. At midnight between Aug. 28 and Aug. 29, hundreds of rebel soldiers stormed the capital, Niamey. The attack, which began as an outpouring of frustration over battlefield setbacks and poor welfare benefits, quickly morphed into an attempt to overthrow President Abdourahamane Tchiani, who seized power in the West African state in a coup three years ago.

After a 24-hour standoff between the mutineers and government forces, Africa Corps—a Russian paramilitary organization and successor of the now-defunct Wagner Group—came to the state’s aid by dispatching airborne assets, which allowed forces loyal to the junta to regain control.

For several hours last month, the fate of the Nigerien junta hung by a thread. At midnight between Aug. 28 and Aug. 29, hundreds of rebel soldiers stormed the capital, Niamey. The attack, which began as an outpouring of frustration over battlefield setbacks and poor welfare benefits, quickly morphed into an attempt to overthrow President Abdourahamane Tchiani, who seized power in the West African state in a coup three years ago.

After a 24-hour standoff between the mutineers and government forces, Africa Corps—a Russian paramilitary organization and successor of the now-defunct Wagner Group—came to the state’s aid by dispatching airborne assets, which allowed forces loyal to the junta to regain control.

For years, Russia has drawn criticism for using counterterrorism deals to prop up client state regimes, including those of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. This year alone, the Africa Corps helped Mali’s junta thwart a large-scale jihadi offensive on the capital city, Bamako; in Niger itself, the group was instrumental in foiling terrorist attacks in January and June.

Russia’s role in Niger’s failed mutiny marks the first time that the Africa Corps has intervened to save an African regime from an internal rebellion. Russia’s presence in West Africa has evolved from a security partnership to a literal praetorian guard for hire, ensnaring Niger in a dependency trap that could transform the country into a de facto Russian protectorate instead of a sovereign state.

As the dust settles, Russia’s evolving Sahel playbook is further redrawing the balance of power in a region where Western influence has already diminished. In the short term, Moscow’s position will be strengthened in Niger, as will its appeal across the region.

But Russia’s strategy is not without danger. By positioning itself as a regime protector without investing in economic growth and humanitarian aid, Moscow is staking its credibility on a counterterrorism mission that no foreign power has yet been able to control—which could open a crucial window for Western powers eager to regain authority in the region.

Western presence in the Sahel deteriorated rapidly between 2020 and 2023, when France and the United States lost most of their military bases after a wave of coups brought military juntas into power in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Riding a wave of popular resentment toward France’s overbearing role in its former colonies, the juntas revoked defense pacts with Western partners and switched allegiance to Russia. They also broke with the Economic Community of West African States and formed a rival regional bloc, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).

Save for a few verbal proclamations, that latter bloc—which binds........

© Foreign Policy