Analysis and updates

Iran is once again on fire. For the better part of the last month, Iranians have been taking to the streets in large numbers to demand change. The proximate cause for the protests was spiraling inflation, but as the crowds grew, Iranians clamored for the end of the Islamic regime.

Despite the avalanche of speculation, no one knows what will happen in Iran. That is the nature of popular uprisings, they are unpredictable. To many analysts, journalists, pundits, and academics, this round of protests feels different from previous ones in 2009, 2017, 2019, and 2022—and maybe they are. Or maybe they just seem that way because the policy community has failed for decades to understand the nature of the Islamic Republic.

Iran is once again on fire. For the better part of the last month, Iranians have been taking to the streets in large numbers to demand change. The proximate cause for the protests was spiraling inflation, but as the crowds grew, Iranians clamored for the end of the Islamic regime.

Despite the avalanche of speculation, no one knows what will happen in Iran. That is the nature of popular uprisings, they are unpredictable. To many analysts, journalists, pundits, and academics, this round of protests feels different from previous ones in 2009, 2017, 2019, and 2022—and maybe they are. Or maybe they just seem that way because the policy community has failed for decades to understand the nature of the Islamic Republic.

The stakes are so high in Iran that even with protesters still out on the streets and the outcome of the current uprising unknown, it is a good time for analysts to reexamine the assumptions that have been the foundation of Washington’s failed approach to the country—and not just Washington’s but the West’s more generally. My goal is not to name and shame. There’s so much of that online that it’s hard to learn from past mistakes, bad assumptions, and new information. It is particularly important for the foreign-policy community to update its assumptions now because Iran is changing. Even if the regime does not fall, the country will be different from what it was like on Dec. 28, 2025, the day the protests began.

So, what were the assumptions that formed the basis of the United States’ approach to Iran over the last three decades? Iran was believed to be pragmatic. The revolutionary ardor of its leadership was actually a rhetorical cover for an Iran that was practical and realistic. This framing led to the notion........

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