Get audio access with any FP subscription. Subscribe Now ALREADY AN FP SUBSCRIBER? LOGIN

Get audio access with any FP subscription.

ALREADY AN FP SUBSCRIBER? LOGIN

Upon taking office in May, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi knew he would face the challenge of dealing with Iran-backed armed groups in the country. He might not have known how quickly or how intensely: On July 27, drones reportedly launched from Iraq targeted oil facilities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province. Although Iraqi armed groups denied responsibility, two days later Saudi Arabia and the United States carried out coordinated strikes against Iran-backed factions, reportedly killing at least 20 militia members. Whether the exchange remains contained is unclear. But it has already demonstrated Zaidi’s predicament: how to restrain armed groups capable of drawing Iraq into a regional conflict while balancing Baghdad’s relationships with the United States and Iran.

The escalation came not long after Zaidi had traveled to Washington for his first state visit. On the surface, the trip was a success. Zaidi and his delegation signed some 50 memoranda of understanding, while U.S. President Donald Trump said he expected him to become a “great leader in the Middle East.” But the flattering reception could not alter the conditions awaiting Zaidi upon his return to Baghdad: an oil-dependent economy, a fragmented political system, powerful armed factions, and the inescapable rivalry between Washington and Tehran.

Upon taking office in May, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi knew he would face the challenge of dealing with Iran-backed armed groups in the country. He might not have known how quickly or how intensely: On July 27, drones reportedly launched from Iraq targeted oil facilities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province. Although Iraqi armed groups denied responsibility, two days later Saudi Arabia and the United States carried out coordinated strikes against Iran-backed factions, reportedly killing at least 20 militia members. Whether the exchange remains contained is unclear. But it has already demonstrated Zaidi’s predicament: how to restrain armed groups capable of drawing Iraq into a regional conflict while balancing Baghdad’s relationships with the United States and Iran.

The escalation came not long after Zaidi had traveled to Washington for his first state visit. On the surface, the trip was a success. Zaidi and his delegation signed some 50 memoranda of understanding, while U.S. President Donald Trump said he expected him to become a “great leader in the Middle East.” But the flattering reception could not alter the conditions awaiting Zaidi upon his return to Baghdad: an oil-dependent economy, a fragmented political system, powerful armed factions, and the inescapable rivalry between Washington and Tehran.

Whether the immediate crisis escalates will depend on myriad factors beyond Zaidi’s control. Over time, however, Zaidi has an opportunity that was not afforded his predecessors: The U.S.-led global coalition against the Islamic State is ending its mission. As a result, the multilateral security relationship that has defined U.S.-Iraqi ties for more than a decade is giving way to a bilateral one. That shift should allow Baghdad to negotiate the scope and terms of security cooperation with Washington—as opposed to a broader framework involving multiple countries—tailoring it more closely to Iraqi priorities, making the government more clearly accountable for the arrangement at home, and giving it a chance to better manage the regional quandary it faces.

Zaidi has presented himself as a break with the past. A young businessman with no established political track record, he is unlike the veteran politicians who have dominated Iraq’s post-2003 order. That appears to be one reason the Trump administration preferred him over other contenders for the premiership. Yet changing the occupant of the prime minister’s office does not change the system over which........

© Foreign Policy