The last time U.S. President Donald Trump attended a Group of Seven (G-7) leaders’ summit in Canada, in 2018, he treated it like a reality TV show. “Trump Blows Up G7 Agenda,” read the headline in Politico. Trump arrived late; called for Russia’s readmission to the group (a nonstarter with the other members); described the host, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, as “very dishonest and weak”; and refused at the last minute to endorse the joint statement at the end of the meeting.

This month, as leaders of the advanced industrialized democracies that make up the G-7—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—prepare for their annual summit, Canada is hosting once again. With Trump’s tariff war in full swing and targeting the other countries in attendance, this meeting could be even more contentious than his last visit.

But it doesn’t have to be. The G-7 has the potential to play a meaningful role in global governance: taking on a position the Trump administration does not want for the United States and addressing the problems of burden sharing that appear to lie at the root of many of Trump’s concerns about U.S. global leadership. In previous meetings, G-7 members have made clear their interest in addressing technological advancements, public health, major wars, and other issues beyond the group’s traditional mandate. With many international institutions today paralyzed by geopolitical rivalries, the world needs concerted action now more than ever.

Yet to truly turn the G-7 into a body that can sustain the rules-based order, its members need to bolster their ranks, streamline their procedures, and strengthen the group’s legitimacy in the eyes of the world. Pulling off this reinvention would position the G-7 for leadership—and could even be the kind of sweeping project that appeals to Trump.

Global governance is in crisis. Wars in Europe and the Middle East, collusion among autocratic powers, and possible nuclear proliferation in Asia and the Middle East have divided members of the UN Security Council, making the once active body effectively nonfunctional. In the last five years alone, Russia has vetoed 14 draft Security Council resolutions on Gaza, Mali, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, nuclear proliferation, and human rights. China has aided this obstruction in 11 of these cases, voting down five resolutions and abstaining from the votes for six. Yet advances in artificial intelligence and synthetic biology require new standards and norms, and the need for resilient supply chains, pandemic preparedness, and clean development demands that countries work together to solve problems—none of which is possible under the current global system.

Without a functioning UN, it falls on individual countries or institutions to uphold the international order. But under Trump, the United States has abdicated its role as the underwriter of the post–World War II rules-based system. The Trump administration is not interested in promoting due process, accountability, representative governance, open capital flows, or liberal trade policies. Authoritarian governments in China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are working together to undermine, not to support, the institutions and norms of the order. Many middle powers—such as Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—want to use the liberal order when it helps them, but they also want to engage with the authoritarian axis. Countries in the global South, meanwhile, are not powerful enough to lead.

Many institutions are not strong candidates for leadership, either. The G-20 was a stabilizing force during the 2008 global financial crisis, but the size of the grouping and the rivalries among China, Russia, the United States, and others have since hamstrung its ability to take collective action. The World Trade Organization, with over 160 members, cannot find consensus on anything, and it has failed to stop China or the United States from weaponizing trade against each other and the world. The ten-country BRICS bloc—which includes founding members Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, as well as five newer members—seeks to diminish international institutions historically dominated by the West.

Smaller groupings have proliferated as countries search for alternative rule-making bodies. In the last decade, these have included the Quad (a diplomatic partnership among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), AUKUS (a security partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (a U.S.-led economic initiative with 14 members), the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (a 12-country free trade agreement), and trilateral cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States. But none of these groups are currently in a position to set rules that the........

© Foreign Affairs