Donald Trump’s rise was supposed to have upended the liberal international order. In his first term, Trump openly disparaged longtime European allies, pulled out of international treaties such as the Paris climate agreement, and decried how the United States was subsidizing its allies through military support and trade deficits. Yet as we argued in Foreign Affairs in 2022, Trump’s aggressive unilateralism did not break U.S. alliances. Shaken and often irritated by Washington’s bullying, the allies nevertheless did not drift away from the world’s preeminent superpower. The foreign relations doctrines, defense spending, and geopolitical alignments of core U.S. partners such as France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea did not shift in any meaningful way during the first Trump administration. Instead, these countries accommodated Trump because they felt that loosening ties with the United States would be more dangerous to their economic and security interests than trying to stand up to his abuse.

Trump’s second term has put this dynamic to an even sterner test. The president’s disdain for U.S. allies and partners is much greater this time around. He has talked about annexing Canada and Greenland, bombing Mexico, retaking the Panama Canal, and giving up on Ukraine and Taiwan, to name just a few. Trump, claiming that allies are ripping off the United States, is demanding large, ill-defined investments in the United States that look a lot like bribes. For instance, he wants a staggering $600 billion investment guarantee from the European Union to be used at his discretion. He seems to be leaning into the notion that alliances are not pillars of a mutually beneficial network but elements of a protection racket—and that it’s high time for the United States to reap the rewards.

If allies had hoped that the election of Joe Biden in 2020 would restore traditional American liberal internationalism, Trump’s reelection proves that the foreign policy belligerence and explicit quid pro quo basis for U.S. commitments evident in his first term was not an aberration. Instead, as demonstrated in the administration’s just-released National Security Strategy, it will probably be a core part of U.S. foreign policy moving forward. Future Republican leaders are likely to continue to promote Trump’s overall policy direction. And even if the Democrats retake control, the ability of Trump-aligned Republicans to exercise power in a two-party system will undermine the United States’ reliability as an ally.

So far in Trump’s second term, U.S. allies have not yet defected. In October, Trump visited Japan and South Korea, and each country’s leaders signaled their desire to stay in the president’s good graces. Just as we concluded in 2022, the allies still seem to be all right. But they are much more worried than before. Unlike eight years ago, countries can no longer wish away the implications of a United States that might not support them in a crisis. Instead, over the next decade, it is likely that U.S. allies will start to noticeably drift away. They may still hope for U.S. support, but they are also starting to........

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