Israel and the United States may have launched the war on Iran. But it is the Gulf Arab states that have borne the brunt of Tehran’s response. Since February 28, the Islamic Republic has rained down missiles and drones on Gulf hotels and airports. It has hit their oil and gas infrastructure. National energy companies in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar have declared force majeure because they cannot fulfill their contractual obligations.

For the Gulf countries, this conflict has been a reckoning. Although they are not saying it publicly, the war has caused leaders throughout the region to reassess their relationship with United States and its president, Donald Trump. Many Gulf monarchs had welcomed the reelection of Trump because they liked his transactional foreign policy style. Unlike other recent presidents, Trump paid little heed to the Gulf’s spotty human rights record and was happy to advance economic deals without concern for conflicts of interest. Some Gulf governments even felt they had sway over Trump: in May 2025, for example, Saudi Arabia persuaded him to lift sanctions on Syria and to back the country’s new president.

But in this round of fighting, the warnings of Gulf leaders have gone unheeded. In the months before, they argued against opening a new round of conflict with Iran and urged Trump to keep negotiating with Iranian leaders. Yet despite personal visits from the Saudi crown prince, Emirati leaders, and other regional officials, Trump went ahead with the attacks. He ultimately gave more weight to the wants of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who long desired a major joint and decisive operation against Iran.

Gulf leaders are increasingly aware that Trump’s unpredictability can be dangerous and that U.S. desires often clash with their own. But pivoting away from the United States won’t be easy. There is no other country that can replace it: Gulf leaders’ cautious outreach toward Iran, for example, failed to stop Tehran’s attacks, and their quiet cooperation with Israel didn’t prevent that state’s officials from upending the entire region. Washington, then, remains the only government that is both willing and able to offer security, at least for the time being.

Yet Gulf countries must try to claw back some autonomy. To do so, the countries’ leaders ought to quickly coalesce around a strategy designed to limit escalation, maintain flexibility, and protect economic growth so they can sustain their domestic agendas. They will have to move beyond their earlier strategy of managed hedging—or relying on the United States while selectively engaging with Iran and Israel—and instead create a new regional equilibrium. They will need to set up new channels for diplomacy between the region’s competitors. And they will have to form better and more durable regional partnerships with countries that are not the United States—and create stronger linkages among themselves.

There is much about the present Middle East that is alarming to Gulf leaders. But Israel’s growing aggression is of particular concern. In the past, some regional officials—namely, the Emiratis and Bahrainis—saw their Israeli counterparts as useful security and........

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