To recall the last negotiated peace with Russia is to tell a depressing tale. Russia invaded Ukraine in March 2014, annexing Crimea and then moving regular and irregular forces into the Donbas, in the country’s east. After months of war and intense interference in domestic Ukrainian affairs, Moscow signed a series of cease-fire agreements in the Belarusian capital of Minsk in September 2014 and February 2015. Russia retained and militarized the territory it had taken in Ukraine. The Minsk agreements did not solve any core problems, but Europe and the United States were able to live with them—until February 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The Minsk process reveals how Putin has often mixed conventional diplomacy with thuggery. Although he has assembled a formidable war machine, Putin aspires to the role of European statesman, as Joseph Stalin did before him and as various Russian tsars did before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Putin sees diplomacy as war by other means, and he used past negotiations over Ukraine to distract and to keep European countries off balance. He hoped to foment political breakdown in Kyiv, a loss of interest on Europe’s part, and a transatlantic relationship sundered by populism. When the desired results of the Minsk agreements did not materialize, Putin once again resorted to war.

Were Putin to eventually consent to a full or partial cease-fire, his strategy would likely be similar to what it was a decade ago. So far, the Russian leader has stubbornly refused to stop fighting until Ukraine makes substantial concessions: he has insisted that Russia seeks a comprehensive settlement and not a mere suspension of hostilities. But if Putin does agree to a truce, he will approach it as a roundabout way of reaching war aims that cannot be achieved on the battlefield. He would exploit an incomplete peace to incite political instability in Ukraine and prod pro-Russian factions in Europe into advocating business as usual with Moscow. He would hope that by allowing U.S. President Donald Trump to take credit for the cease-fire, he could widen the fissures between the United States and Europe. If Putin found the consequences of his overture disappointing, he could return to battle at any moment, having risked only the breather a cease-fire might afford Ukraine. U.S. and European officials should proceed with great caution in the laudable aim of war termination. A mere halt to the fighting in Ukraine would have little chance of ending the broader conflict. Barring a fundamental change in Putin’s calculus, it may just mark a transition to the next phase of the war.

Russia’s political project for Ukraine has failed spectacularly. The Kremlin never mounted the coercive power necessary to transform Ukraine into a vassal, which would have required a complete takeover and long-term occupation. In 2022, Russia invaded a large country—one with a population of over 35 million—with a mere 150,000 soldiers. Its intent at the time was to expose the Ukrainian government as feeble and illegitimate, inspire uprisings among pro-Russian constituencies, and compel the rest of Ukraine to accept a government friendly to Moscow. Four years of brutal war have done the opposite, ensuring a Ukraine hostile to Russia for years, if not generations, to come. Having expended massive amounts of manpower and materiel, Putin has no clear path to military victory. After all his effort, he has maneuvered himself into a dead end.

To rescue his fortunes, Putin has options for escalation, although each comes with severe limitations and risks. He could take advantage of Russia’s huge population........

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