Using Kurds as a ground force will not bear results.

Washington’s challenge in the Middle East is not only that it builds hollow armies. It is that it treats entire peoples as disposable instruments—nowhere more clearly than in its long, uneasy relationship with the Kurds.

For years, U.S. officials measured progress in Iraq by the number of troops trained, units stood up, and equipment delivered. Billions of dollars later, the Iraqi army collapsed almost instantly when ISIS swept across northern Iraq in 2014. Soldiers abandoned U.S.-supplied vehicles and fled. This was not an unforeseeable shock but the predictable outcome of a strategy that mistakes money and metrics for legitimacy and will.

Rather than rethink that model, Washington pivoted to a new wager: if Arab partner forces were brittle, perhaps Kurdish fighters could be the reliable edge of American power. That gamble has again betrayed its limits—politically, strategically, and morally.

The Long Allure—and Long Risk—of the “Kurdish Card”

For decades, some policymakers in Washington have viewed Kurdish groups as a potential source of leverage in a region where the United States often struggles to shape events. Kurdish populations span Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, and certain Kurdish parties have longstanding tensions with Tehran. This created a perception—sometimes quietly encouraged in Washington—that Kurdish networks could offer intelligence, influence, or pressure in dealings with Iran.

But this vision carried an unspoken contradiction. Hinting at support or protection without any intention of guaranteeing it........

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