Europe’s security debate has entered dangerous territory. Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds into a fourth year, pounding cities and power grids. NATO’s eastern flank braces for the next strike. President Donald Trump warns allies to “pay up or fend for yourselves.” And in Berlin, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has begun to flirt with an idea once unthinkable: revisiting Germany’s post1945 renunciation of nuclear weapons.

This must stop here. A German nuclear weapon is not a policy option. It is a red line—legal, historical, and civilizational—that Europe cannot afford to cross.

This is not about mistrusting modern Germany. It is about preserving the architecture that has kept Europe stable for eight decades. The prohibition on German nuclear arms is not a Cold War leftover. It is the foundation stone of the postwar order.

In 1954, the modified Brussels Treaty barred West Germany from producing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. That was the price of rearmament and the only basis on which France and the Benelux states would accept a rearmed Germany inside NATO. It was not punishment. It was the structural guarantee that made Western Europe’s recovery and integration possible.

Reunification did not soften this principle—it cemented it. The 1990 Two Plus Four........

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