The idea of occupying Venezuela, while it may at first glance be presented as a decisive move in foreign policy or a tool for restoring U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, is in reality less a response to external crises than a generator of deep internal crises within the United States. American historical experience shows that wars and military occupations—especially when launched with vague objectives and without domestic consensus—sooner or later bring their effects back inside the country’s borders. Venezuela is no exception to this rule; rather, because of its geographic location, social conditions, and political sensitivity, it could become a condensed example of all of America’s previous failures in foreign interventions.

The starting point of this cycle is economic cost. Military occupation, even if conceived as a limited and short-term operation, in practice turns into a long-term commitment whose expenses quickly spiral out of control. The United States has yet to fully absorb the financial consequences of the post–September 11 wars: rising public debt, pressure on the federal budget, and a reduced capacity to invest in domestic infrastructure are all legacies of those interventions. Entering a new occupation in Venezuela would mean injecting billions of additional dollars into the war machine at a time when American society is grappling with a housing crisis, economic inequality, and the deterioration of public services. This growing gap between........

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