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How Pakistan Failed To Follow Through On Its Initial Success In Operation Sindoor – OpEd

13 12
29.01.2026

Highlights of a study by the Centre for Military History and Perspective Studies (CHPM) in Switzerland

The May 7 to 10, 2025 clash between the Pakistan and Indian air forces initially saw the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) achieve a clear tactical victory by shooting down several enemy fighters. But the PAF failed to deliver in subsequent strikes against Indian installations because of the efficient Indian air defence system. 

When the Indians retaliated in strength, the Pakistani air defence was found to be wanting, said a study by the Centre for Military History and Perspective Studies (CHPM) in Switzerland.

The study, entitled “Operation Sindoor: The India-Pakistan Air War (7-10 May 2025),” conducted by Adrien Fontanellaz, stated that the effectiveness of the Indian air defence system was “one of the surprises of the conflict.”

Fontanellaz further said that the Indian Air Force (IAF) also managed to significantly degrade the enemy’s air defence system, carrying out a series of spectacular strikes against Pakistan’s principal Air Force stations. “Thus, by achieving clear air superiority, India coerced Islamabad into requesting a ceasefire,” the study said.

Following are the highlights of the report-  

After the attack on Pahagam by Pakistan-based terrorists n April 22,  India’s three armed services, in coordination with the various intelligence agencies, developed several response scenarios targeting the infrastructure of Pakistan-based jihadist organisations involved in attacks against India. Tactical planning began on 29 April, with the selection of targets – nine camps belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Toiba  (LeT)– and the strike date was fixed for May 5. Seven of the nine selected camps were located close to the borde, and their destruction was assigned to the Indian Army. The remaining two were located deeper inside Pakistani territory, and the IAF was therefore tasked with striking them.

The operation was to be limited to specific targets, but India was prepared for a full-scale conventional war if Pakistan initiated it.

At around 01:00 hrs on May 7, Indian aircraft launched a series of long-range munitions against the complex that housed the JeM headquarters at Bahawalpur, 100 kms from the border. Five buildings were targeted and at least one was destroyed. Another formation released a second salvo of guided munitions against the LeT headquarters at Muridke. At least two of the targeted buildings were confirmed to have been hit.

One of the two Indian strike formations, composed of Rafale or Mirage 2000I aircraft, penetrated Pakistani airspace at very low altitude before executing a pop-up manoeuvre to release precision-guided bombs. In doing so, the aircraft deliberately exposed themselves to interception by Pakistani fighters and ground-based air defence systems.

But Pakistan had detected the IAF strike and diversion formations shortly after midnight. In twenty minutes, they identified eight distinct groups of six to eight aircraft each, concentrated along four main axes, totalling 60 aircraft, including 14 Rafales, reinforced by a further dozen combat aircraft.

Several J-10C and JF-17 fighters fired at least one salvo of PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles, while an HQ-9 or HQ-16 surface-to-air missile battery also engaged Indian fighters. Pakistani forces concentrated their fire on the Rafale. Islamabad subsequently claimed the destruction of six Indian aircraft over an hour-long sequence, including three Rafale, one Su-30MKI, one MiG-29UPG and a large drone, all shot down inside Indian airspace at ranges reported between 13 and 98 kilometres from the border or the Line of Control.

The Indian Air Force remained silent regarding its losses during the night as well as the return fire from its combat aircraft, merely stating that all pilots involved in the operation were safe.

The subsequent circulation of images of wreckage fragments on social media and in Indian and Pakistani media, however, confirmed the loss of at least one Rafale (serial number BS001), one Mirage 2000 and either one MiG-29UPG or one Su-30MKI.

The discovery of multiple PL-15 missile casings on Indian territory indicates that other IAF pilots successfully decoyed or evaded some of the missiles fired against them. The presence of an intact BrahMos on the ground further suggests that at least one pilot had to jettison his underwing stores to improve the effectiveness of evasive manoeuvres, demonstrating that, in addition to several aircraft losses, the Pakistanis achieved a mission kill, that is, forcing an adversary to abandon its mission before it could be carried out.

The Indians appear to have assumed that the Pakistanis would continue adhering to their established practice of refraining from firing at aircraft outside Pakistani airspace. Indian pilots were therefore likely taken by surprise by long-range Pakistani fire. Some Pakistani fighters may have succeeded in........

© Eurasia Review