By declaring that “We have fought three wars for Kashmir, and if necessary, we will fight ten more,” Pakistan army chief Gen Syed Asim Munir has once again proved that despite all the embarrassment that it has caused, Rawalpindi’s congenital ‘foot-in-the-mouth’ disease still persists. It also reflects the deep sense of frustration prevalent within the Pakistan army due to its abysmal failure to set right what former army chief Gen Raheel Sharif referred to a decade ago as the “unfinished agenda of Partition.” 

Hence, Gen Munir’s angst though misplaced is nevertheless understandable since it stems from his deep sense of hopelessness in fructifying Rawalpindi’s unfulfilled Kashmir dream.

 It was the Pakistan army that prevailed over the country’s legislature to opt for the military option to seize J&K in 1947; it was the Pakistan army’s mammoth military blunder of allowing its tribal proxies led by army regulars who had reached within an earshot of Srinagar on October 26, 1947 to temporarily halt their advance and pillage Baramulla instead of pushing ahead and completing their assigned task of seizing J&K’s summer capital. This inexplicable delay cost the Pakistan army dear!

Brig [later Maj Gen] Akbar Khan, the architect of this operation [codenamed Operation Gulmarg] has in his book Raiders in Kashmir, admits that “The tribesmen had reached here [Baramulla] on the 26th. Until then Kashmir had not acceded to India and Indian troops had not been flown in. The State troops, thoroughly demoralised, had retreated in disorder. Only 35 more miles remained of level road and virtually no resistance. The tribesmen had a barely two hour journey left—and before them lay Srinagar, trembling, seemingly at their mercy. But the tribesmen had not moved forward that day, nor [the] next day.” [Emphasis added]

While Khan has questioned “… why had two crucial days been wasted at........

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