The growing military embrace between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Israel is not a routine diplomatic engagement. It is a strategic alignment that risks deepening polarization and accelerating instability in an already volatile region. Far from being a ceremonial visit, the defence agreements reportedly on the table signal the consolidation of a security bloc whose long-term consequences may undermine prospects for peace and fuel arms competition across Asia and the Middle East.

At the centre of this narrative are the expected major defence agreements involving full technology transfer of Iron Dome and Iron Beam capabilities. Unlike typical arms sales, technology transfers involve joint production, licensing of source code, shared maintenance responsibilities, and knowledge exchange. What might appear at first as a capability enhancement carries deeper strategic implications. Once integrated into a state’s defence infrastructure, these systems generate dependency loops that complicate policy choices in periods of crisis.

The numbers involved are striking. The Iron Dome system’s interceptor missiles cost between $50,000 and $100,000 per round, according to a range of analyses by defence experts. Iron Beam, a directed-energy counterpart under development, reportedly neutralizes incoming threats at “double-digit cents” per shot, a cost difference of roughly 1,000 times cheaper for each interception. The U.S. Department of Defence spent over $1.8 billion on Iron Dome co-production with Israel before; if India secures full technology rights, it could avoid future licensing costs, but lock itself into an industrial ecosystem designed outside its own defence R&D institutions.

Whether laser defences are stabilizing is not just academic. In 2021, Iron Dome systems intercepted more than 1,500 rockets fired from Gaza into Israeli territory, achieving an interception rate often cited above 90 percent for targets assessed as threats. That performance is often framed as defensive success. But those same statistics are used by critics to justify more aggressive strategic posturing, framing the system as a shield behind which offensive operations are planned. When neighbouring states perceive such layered defences, they often invest proportionally in offensive strike........

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