GPS-denied drones rely on onboard systems such as inertial measurement units, visual odometry, LIDAR, terrain-matching cameras, and AI computer vision to navigate without satellite signals, rendering traditional jamming and spoofing far less effective.

The Russia-Ukraine war has served as the primary testing ground for these technologies, including long-range strike drones and fiber-optic-controlled systems that maintain operator links immune to radio jamming.

India is developing comparable capabilities through private firms and DRDO efforts, with systems such as Nagastra-1 already used operationally and newer GPS-denied platforms undergoing trials for longer range and heavier payloads.

Imagine a soldier who loses his eyes in battle, yet still walks straight to his target without one mistake. That, in simple words, is what a GPS-denied drone does. The next war will not be won by the country with the best satellite navigation. It will be won by the side that needs GPS the least.

This is not theory. Ukraine has been sending a long-range strike drone called the FP-1 deep inside Russian territory. Reported to cost around fifty thousand dollars, it is said to fly close to 1,800 kilometres and reach its targets before defenders can react. Jamming did not work. Spoofing, where a false satellite signal is fed to confuse a drone, did not work either. The machine simply ignored everything and depended on its own brain.

How does it manage this? Every such drone carries an........

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