The high impact, sharp-retaliatory response named Operation Ghazab Lil Haq was launched on 27 February 2026 in response to what security authorities believe is an increasing threat network base in the Afghan territory. The first figures that are being drained out are grim 133 Taliban Kharjis were reported to have been killed, more than 200 injured, and other deaths are expected to be witnessed once they strike military installations in Kabul, Paktia and Kandahar. The authorities also indicate that 27 posts had been destroyed and 9 of them captured, 2 corps headquarters, 3 brigade headquarters, 2 ammunition depots, one logistics base, 3 battalion headquarters, 2 sector headquarters, and more than 80 tanks, artillery pieces and armoured personnel carriers had also been destroyed.

Those numbers, in case they were genuine, can be regarded as a symbolic rather than a degrading command, control and sustainment campaign. There is no news cycle of striking headquarters, depots and logistics nodes. It is everything to destabilize the movement, fighting and restorative of a force. Another dimension is taking posts: it presupposes ground follow through and standoff strikes only. In other words, there will not be safe spaces and depth that will not be perceived as untouchable any longer.

To start with, the real problem in the area is that of armed groups, cross border facilitation, and how the Afghan territory has been exploited to several occasions as a staging ground, training ground and bargaining points over politics. The same trend has made many states in the neighbourhood not one to be spared by the blood. They are taking advantage of an accumulating sense of disappointment that has built up over the years when leaders are declaring that Afghanistan is sponsoring different terrorist groups and is disrupting the whole of the region. There is not one case of border or one attack. It is the perception that everything involved in hosting, tolerating and silently supporting violent actors will be shifted to other parties.

Second, the figures of the estimated casualty and the list of the targets in the first few hours of any operation are claims, not decisions. Even those early numbers printed with good faith lack completeness, rose coloured, and the need to create an impression of being in control. Verification takes time. Even the independent confirmation is usually days or weeks late should there be such. Thus, the arguments must be seen as provisional to the people, despite the fact that the tactical purpose cannot be ignored.

The significance of such strategic intent is because the retaliatory counteraction continues to be the case as the brief believes. Constant opposing may mean constant pressure, or may mean a spiral. The difference is founded on discipline and purposefulness. To the extent that the political objective is to reduce the ability of violent networks to coordinate and execute attacks, then the operation should be supported by a straightforward and visible criterion: the targets must be tied to a particular threat behaviour, the civilian casualties must be reduced and acknowledged whenever they do occur, and the use of force should be complemented by an end state of politics, not devolved into a form of open-ended punishment.

The ruse is that military success is a political enticement. After one operation appears to be successful, leaders will start believing that force is everything that will ever be necessary to solve the problem and that is also a governance and legitimacy problem. Domestic world of Afghanistan is ruined and military is inclined to rob local economies, patronage and tribal politics. Closing of machines and destruction of infrastructure will buy time. It varies incentives on a very sporadic basis. The hate groups can restructure themselves, raise funds and attract new recruits such that they can be in a position to restructure themselves on the rubble. It is the real trial that comes after the strikes.

It was a single, stark, message to Kabul, a message which is despatched in a multitude of ways, that another wave of pressure would be subjected to Kabul in case there is any further forbearance of transnational militant action. Not vague warnings. Some standards: arrests, shut down of known camp, asset freezing and verified limitation against cross border movement.

Unless two or more countries consider the Afghani soil as a tool of destabilizing them, then they need to share common systems of intelligence sharing, border control and money laundering. Otherwise, all states are left to their own devices and military groups exploit the loopholes.

Three, a humanitarian and civilian protection prism that is not viewed as a side thought. Even when the military targets are being struck, the lives of civilians are at risk, despite the fact that the attack is on the urban node like Kabul. Credible position involves the open enquiries in scenarios of credible allegations arising and a rational course of action to limit the harm like timing and targeting parameters and rules of the action pursued. This is not charity. It is strategic. Insurgent narratives are made to live through civilian suffering.

Four, an information strategy that does not lie in pursuing success. Lots of empty promises and broken equipment’s come in very handy today but broken trust tomorrow. Give promises which you are sure that you can keep in future. Display locations and circumstances in case of posts taken without exposing operations. Where destroyed depots, furnish imagery where there are. Human beings can cope with complexity. What they resent is spin.

The region is on a crossroads. There will be an increase in unilateral weapons targeting the neighbours since Afghanistan does not become a confined battlefield of violent groups. These actions as Ghazab Lil Haq are even more likely than less likely. Danger there is, there is real danger in that course: there is intensification, there is error, there is displacement, and an extended conflict in which no one can be confident of everything.

© Eurasia Review