As the Philippines takes over as the 2026 ASEAN Chair, it is clear that the South China Sea dispute and maritime security issue will form the very core of the Philippine agenda for ASEAN 2026. The best case scenario for the Philippines would be a revised and fortified code of conduct on South China Sea, the chances of which have gone weaker latterly, particularly keeping in view the The Trump administration’s long-awaited 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), released in December 2025, which mark a fundamental shift from liberal internationalist values to a more transactional, interest-based, America-first ‘chaos’ in US foreign policy. 

Apparently, the US no longer seems interested in containing China and is open to accepting “the outsized influence of larger, richer, and stronger nations” as “a timeless truth of international relations“. In other words, China and Russia are no longer its competitors or threats to the Rules-based international order, and both Beijing and Moscow can have their own spheres of influence. Trump’s Venezuela adventure and statements about taking Greenland from Denmark have only encouraged China and Russia to establish their own versions of the Donroe doctrines in their respective spheres of influence.

This approach puts America’s Asian partners and allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in a precarious situation and potential conflict flashpoints – the Taiwan straits, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea – involving China on a short fuse. What has been striking is that the strategy lacks direct reference to Southeast Asia, speaking volumes about Trump’s reoriented focus. It is mentioned only twice, both with reference to China and Taiwan. In contrast, the 2022 strategy not only highlighted the significance of Southeast Asia but........

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