Turkiye has long paid a heavy price for being bordered by unstable states. Now, it faces another conflict at its doorstep that threatens to spill across the region. On Saturday, the US and Israel attacked Iran and, in response, Tehran launched strikes against Israeli territory, US military bases and civilian infrastructure in the Gulf states.

This is the nightmare scenario that Ankara has long wanted to avoid. Having been deeply affected for decades by the wars in Iraq and Syria, Ankara’s position had been clear for a long time: it opposed an attack against Iran, regardless of the rationale behind it. Ankara has carefully weighed up the short and long-term costs of such a conflict and is well aware that, if it prolongs, it will face serious security, economic and political consequences.

The Turkish political elite is now navigating this conflict with its usual pragmatic crisis management strategy. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in his first reaction to the attacks, said: “We condemn the US-Israel attacks against our neighbor Iran, while Iran’s attacks on our brother countries in the Gulf are also unacceptable.” Erdogan held phone calls with both the American and Iranian presidents. And Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was among the first to contact his Iranian counterpart, demonstrating that Ankara’s channels remain open with Tehran, which is crucial at this moment. Turkiye also proposed to mediate and has been in talks with all regional actors.

Although Turkiye often has tense relations with Iran due to differences over regional issues, it has historically managed these relations pragmatically, compartmentalizing differences and avoiding direct confrontation. That is why, despite being a NATO member that hosts allied military bases, Iran sees Turkiye as a regional power with an independent foreign policy.

In Iran’s view, Turkiye is a country that is against Israel’s expansionist regional policies. In June 2025, when Israel attacked Iran, Turkiye supported Tehran’s right to self-defense. It has now made it clear that it will not permit the use of its airspace for attacks on Iran. For Turkiye, things are crystal clear: this is not NATO’s war, it is a US-Israeli war in which Turkiye has neither responsibility nor interest other than endorsing diplomacy to de-escalate it.

It is evident that these attacks aim to topple the regime, beyond other ambitions. Without a proper plan, this scenario could drag Iran into chaos and fragmentation. Ankara has been evaluating contingency plans for some time. Prior to the attacks, Turkish officials stated that Ankara was preparing for several potential scenarios regarding Iran and assessing all possible measures in the event of a conflict.

Turkiye’s long border with Iran has led to media speculation that, in the case of conflict, it might enter Iranian territory to prevent a potential influx of refugees. Ankara has denied these reports. It is unlikely to risk violating Iran’s territorial integrity to establish a buffer zone unless its national security is directly threatened. That is why diplomacy has been the first — and, so far, only — tool Ankara has embraced since tensions escalated. It has remained in contact with both sides to de-escalate and, at one point, Turkiye was even considered a potential host for US-Iran talks, though the venue shifted to Muscat, likely due to Tehran’s calculations.

If this conflict drags Iran into chaos and fragmentation, Turkiye — as an immediate neighbor — will have to cope with at least four serious challenges.

First: refugee flows. Due to its proximity, a prolonged conflict along its border could trigger large numbers of refugees heading toward Turkiye, which already hosts millions. Turkiye continues to shoulder the political and economic burden of the Syrian crisis. In 2023, it built a security wall along its border to prevent illegal crossings, smuggling and terrorist infiltration.

Yet, in a worst-case scenario, managing the fallout — especially potential refugee flows — would be extremely challenging. While Iranians can normally enter Turkiye visa-free, Ankara has stated that it would suspend its “open-door” policy in the event of a large-scale refugee wave.

Second: border instability. There is the risk that armed groups in the region may attempt to exploit Turkish, Iraqi and Syrian border areas to expand the conflict, while separatist groups — such as PKK affiliates — in Iran could perceive new opportunities.

Third: the risk of a civil war in Iran. Despite its internal and external challenges, a weakened Iran with border control is different from a fragmented one, which may create a security vacuum that could pose regional instability. I disagree with the argument that a weakened Iran might create geopolitical space for Turkiye to expand its regional influence. Iran no longer has a strong regional ally network: Bashar Assad in Syria has gone, Hezbollah in Lebanon has weakened, and its influence in Yemen and Iraq has stretched. While Turkiye has won against Iran in Syria, the Caucasus and Iraq.

However, the Turkish-Iranian rivalry has never been existential, it has always been competitive. Both sides have historically managed their relations pragmatically, compartmentalizing differences and avoiding direct confrontation.

Fourth: the economy. There is the risk of disruption in energy markets if Iran reacts by closing the Strait of Hormuz. The prolonged conflict could also halt connectivity projects, disrupt trade and affect tourism — one of Turkiye’s key economic sectors.

Turkiye, therefore, needs to walk a tightrope. It has the diplomatic expertise to help de-escalate the situation, particularly with the support of regional actors, and continue pushing for diplomatic channels. At the same time, if the situation deteriorates, it will need to tightly control its border with Iran to contain any spillover effects. Thus, for Turkiye, the stakes go far beyond normal risk management.

Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye’s relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz

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