*Originally published in 2023 and preserved as part of our archive project.Get E-International Relations delivered to your inbox, free of charge. As you sign up, consider becoming a paid subscriber to support our work.

The short-lived June 2023 “rebellion” by Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the Wagner private military corporation, raised the possibility that Vladimir Putin’s continued rule over Russia is not as certain as it previously appeared. Prigozhin has insisted that he was not trying to overthrow Putin, but to oust his rivals—Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov—whom Prigozhin has long blamed for Russia’s poor military performance in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Further, Prigozhin claimed that the justification for the war against Ukraine (especially that Ukraine posed a threat to Russia) was false, and sought to give Putin a means to bring it to an end through blaming it all on “greedy generals.” Prigozhin’s rebellion, though, failed: Shoigu and Gerasimov retain their positions (at least for now), and Putin has made clear that his war on Ukraine will continue.

What is clear is that Putin will not take up Prigozhin’s suggestion of blaming others for the disastrous war in Ukraine in order to end it on terms short of what now appears to be an unattainable Russian victory. It might not be until Putin is succeeded by another leader that Russia can do this. But the Wagner rebellion, even though unsuccessful, has raised the possibility that Putin is vulnerable, and that a successor to him could arise.

Putin, of course, may continue to exert his rule over Russia through the end of the 2020s, the 2030s, or possibly even longer. He succeeded, after all, in facing down the Wagner rebellion. But the Wagner rebellion raises the possibility that he may suddenly and unexpectedly fall from power some time soon. Nobody, including Putin himself, knows for sure when or how his rule over Russia will come to an end. But whether as a result of his death, incapacity, overthrow, or decision not to run for re-election in 2024 (this last being the least likely), Putin’s reign will definitely come to an end at some point.

Just as it is uncertain when Putin’s hold on power will come to an end, it is also uncertain how much or even whether Russia will change after it does. This article will explore the likelihood of five possible post-Putin pathways for Russia: 1) Putinism without Putin; 2) democratization; 3) prudent authoritarianism; 4) Chinese overlordship; and 5) the breakup of Russia.

Just as important, this article will also explore the possibilities for six of Putin’s current domestic and foreign policy priorities to be continued or revised under each of these five potential pathways. These six Putin priorities are: 1) maintaining dictatorship over Russia; 2) maintaining or even enhancing Russia’s great power status; 3) continuing the ongoing war against Ukraine in order to at minimum retain control of Ukrainian territory currently occupied by Russian forces; 4) continuing to see America and the West as Russia’s principal security threats; 5) continuing Russia’s strategic partnership with China despite any misgivings Moscow may have over increasing Russian dependence on Beijing; and 6) maintaining Russia’s territorial integrity. First, though, something needs to be said about Putin’s own commitment to these priorities as well as his ability to pursue them.

Putin is deeply committed to the pursuit of all six of these priorities. He has ruthlessly sought to exert dictatorial control over Russian society through state security and military as well as private military forces (the Wagner Group) and substate security forces (Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s forces). Furthermore, he maintains control over all these forces through encouraging rivalry among them and playing them off against one another.

Putin is also deeply committed to restoring and maintaining Russia’s great power status. Indeed, Putin has pursued this with something akin to religious fervor ever since he first came to power. Putin also appears deeply committed to continuing his war against Ukraine despite all the setbacks and costs that Russia has incurred from doing so. An end to the war involving the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine would not only hurt Russia’s image as a great power but could even threaten Putin’s ability to remain in power. Nor is Putin likely to change his mind about America and the West being the principal security threats faced both by Russia and by his regime. Putin fears the spread of democratization in the post-Soviet space via “color revolution,” and insists that Russia is not just fighting against Ukrainian forces in the current conflict, but against the United States and NATO.

Further, Putin seems determined to continue Russia’s partnership with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Despite China’s taking advantage of Western sanctions on Russia to buy Russian petroleum at a deep discount and unwillingness to (unlike Iran and North Korea) sell arms to Russia for use in Ukraine, Putin sees Xi as an ally against what both consider to be a hostile America. Finally, Putin is determined to maintain Russia’s territorial integrity—something which he insists that the United States is trying to destroy. Indeed, Putin’s occupation of Ukrainian territory is an effort to reclaim for Moscow what Putin sees as rightfully belonging to Russia.

Putin does not seem likely to change a single one of these policy priorities so long as he remains in power. Indeed, for Putin, all six priorities are mutually reinforcing: To maintain Russia’s great power and even its territorial integrity, Russia must be ruled by a dictatorship which confronts the hostile West, cooperates with a China that shares its view of the United States, and eventually defeats........

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