THE debate on new provinces rests on two different levels. The first is the broader technocratic concern with decentralisation and its hypothetical impact on social welfare and economic growth outcomes. The second is the political economy of constitutional and administrative reform in divided polities. Both aspects are important and it is revealing which one is highlighted by whom and at what point.

Let’s start with the first one. Recent research presents a nuanced, but positive leaning relationship between decentralisation reforms and human development/welfare outcomes. In an influential 2016 review article, Channa and Faguet found that decentralisation of health and education spending tends to improve sectoral outcomes, thou­­gh quality of evidence varies considerably across different cases. Miranda-Lescano et al. (2023) found that decentralising subnational government spending (especially health) positively affects HDI across 57 countries (2000-18). They argue further that such welfare/HDI effects have been understudied relative to growth and governance.

The key here is the type of decentralisation that takes place. Reviews of the fiscal decentralisation literature (such as Canare 2021) suggest that revenue decentralisation and fiscal independence, ie, local governments’ ability to raise their own revenue rather than depend on central transfers, are most consistently associated with better development outcomes, while expenditure decentralisation shows no clear pattern.

On a cautionary note, there is some evidence to suggest that in weakly governed contexts, usually characterised by low levels of bureaucratic efficiency and transparency, the proliferation of........

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