Is Washington Reassessing Its Strategic Bet on India?
CounterPunch Exclusives
CounterPunch Exclusives
Is Washington Reassessing Its Strategic Bet on India?
The Pentagon’s decision to restore the designation US Pacific Command (USPACOM), replacing the Indo-Pacific Command name adopted in 2018, has officially been presented as a historical adjustment rather than a strategic shift. According to the Department of Defense, the command’s area of responsibility remains unchanged, stretching from America’s Pacific coastline to India’s western border, while its mission and commitment to maintaining a “free and open” region remain intact.
The 2018 decision to rename Pacific Command as Indo-Pacific Command was more than an administrative change. It reflected a broader strategic vision that placed India at the center of Washington’s approach to Asia and elevated it from a major regional power to a key pillar of the Indo-Pacific framework. Eight years later, the return to the Pacific Command designation raises an important question: is Washington beginning to reassess some of the assumptions that shaped that strategy?
The Indo-Pacific Vision and the India Assumption
The Indo-Pacific concept emerged as the United States sought to respond to China’s growing economic, technological and military influence. At the heart of that framework was the belief that India would play a leading role in preserving a favourable balance of power across the region.
The rationale appeared compelling. India has a population exceeding 1.4 billion people, became the world’s fourth-largest economy in 2025 and spends more than US$86 billion annually on defense. Its geographic location places it astride critical maritime routes connecting the Middle East, Africa and East Asia.
Washington invested heavily in this vision. Defense cooperation expanded dramatically, intelligence sharing deepened and military interoperability increased. The United States and India signed a series of foundational defense agreements while bilateral defense trade grew from virtually zero in the early 2000s to more than US$20 billion. Through mechanisms such as the Quad and exercises such as Malabar, India became increasingly integrated into American strategic planning.
Underlying these developments was a broader assumption: that India would emerge not only as a counterweight to China but also as a stabilizing force in South Asia and a major contributor to regional security.
The question........
